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Only the little people pay taxes.**
Tax evaders [are] stealing from their fellow citizens.  The more
successfully they escape what they owe, the more the rest of us have
to pay.***
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1. The IRS estimates the difference between what taxpayers should pay and what they
actually pay at $345 billion annually.  I.R.S. News Release IR 2007-137 (Aug. 2, 2007)
(amount for the year 2001), available at 2007 WL 2200669.  Based on approximately 170
million federal income tax returns annually, each taxpayer pays an extra $2000 each year ($345
billion/$170 million = $2029).  See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS:
A SIMPLE, FAIR, AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES 15 (2008); see also IRS
2002 Data Book, Oct. 1, 2001-Sept. 30, 2002, at 18 (Table 2, line 1), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=136474,00.html (179,631,000 total income
tax returns filed in calendar year 2001, including 5491 corporate returns, 3868 estate and trust
returns, and 2134 partnership returns).
2. Ed Robinson opened the “largest furniture showroom in South Texas,” but when the
venture did not go as planned, he sued his bankers.  Robinson v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 116, 118
(1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 519 U.S. 824 (1996).
The jury awarded approximately $60 million in damages in response to Robinson’s argument
that the bank failed to release a lien after he repaid the debt secured by the lien.  Id. at 121.
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Introduction
Taxpayers who fail to pay their fair share cause each honest taxpayer to pay
on average over $2000 extra in federal income taxes every year.   This extra1
burden falls primarily on the working class and the poor, who must pay the
amount required by law because of withholding, information reporting, and
other restrictions.  
This Article asserts that the current monetary penalty system fails to curb
tax dodging because it is a fault-based, negligence style system, and any fault-
based system would fail because of systemic features of our federal income
tax.  This Article proposes a new strict liability style penalty system, tempered
by a graduated penalty rate and an exception for any nonfrivolous tax position
conspicuously disclosed.
An example demonstrates the failure of the current system.  Texas Furniture
King Ed Robinson won a multi-million dollar jury verdict in connection with
a business deal.   The jury award stated that approximately three percent was2
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
4 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:1
3. Robinson involved the 1987 and 1988 tax years.  Id. at 117.  In 1987, a taxpayer could
exclude damages for “personal injuries,” including damages for mental anguish, from gross
income.  See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (pre-1996); Fabry v. Comm’r, 223 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (11th
Cir. 2000) (involving damages received in 1992).  After 1996, the exclusion is only available
for damages from “personal physical injuries.”  I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
4. The origin and nature of the claim determines whether damages received are taxable.
See Hort v. Comm’r, 313 U.S. 28, 30-31 (1941).  
5. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 123.  The defendant, a bank, agreed because it could deduct all
amounts paid as ordinary and necessary business expenses, including the punitive damages,
regardless of the allocation.  See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2008); Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57
(stating that a taxpayer can deduct punitive damages for fraudulent acts if the fraudulent acts
were “perpetuated in the ordinary conduct of its business activities”).  In Robinson, the bank
agreed to “work with [Robinson] on the allocation . . . to minimize [his] Federal income tax
liability.”  Robinson, 102 T.C. at 123.  The Tax Court noted that the “Bank . . . did not care
about the manner of allocation.”  Id.
6. Id.  Robinson set out the allocation in the judgment order, which was “simply ‘rubber
stamped’” by the trial judge.  Robinson v. Comm’r, 70 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1995). 
7. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 123.
8. Id. at 124. 
9. Id.
10. Robinson, 102 T.C. 116; Robinson, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
824 (1996).  The IRS and the courts concluded that the tax consequences must follow the
economic substance, as reflected by the jury’s allocation.  Robinson, 102 T.C. at 134-36;
Robinson, 70 F.3d at 38.  The Tax Court found that “[Robinson] deliberately and unilaterally
arrived at the allocations . . . solely with a view to Federal income taxes, and not to reflect the
realities of their settlement,” and concluded that “this Court will not blindly accept the terms
contained in a settlement agreement, especially when the circumstances behind the agreement
indicate that the allocation . . . was uncontested, non-adversarial, and entirely tax-motivated.”
Robinson, 102 T.C. at 129.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed that analysis.  Robinson, 70 F.3d at 38.
11. Neither the Tax Court opinion, nor the Fifth Circuit opinion, indicates that the IRS
for mental anguish, and at the time, damages received for mental anguish were
tax-free.   The jury concluded that the remaining ninety-seven percent was for3
lost profits and punitive damages, which are taxable to the recipient.   4
With an appeal pending, in lieu of the jury award, the Texas Furniture King
agreed to accept ten million dollars in settlement, as long as he could allocate
the damages.   In the settlement, the Texas Furniture King basically flipped the5
jury’s allocation.   He allocated ninety-five percent to tax-free mental anguish6
damages and only five percent to taxable damages.   On his federal income tax7
return, the Texas Furniture King reported only five percent of the damages as
taxable.   8
The IRS happened to audit, and the auditor spotted the issue.  At trial, the
Texas Furniture King’s attorney said that the tax return was merely a “starting
point . . . to negotiate with the [IRS] . . . .”   Although the IRS, the Tax Court,9
and the Fifth Circuit all concluded that the Texas Furniture King’s tax position
was bogus,  the Texas Furniture King was not liable for any tax penalties.10 11
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asserted a penalty.
12. Robinson likely earned investment income on his tax underpayment at a rate at least
equal to the rate of interest charged by the IRS on tax underpayments.  See infra note 13. 
13. Although a taxpayer must pay interest on a tax underpayment from the due date, I.R.C.
§ 6601(a) (2008), a taxpayer can earn interest income on the amount saved from underpaying
taxes, see, e.g., John Herbert Roth, The Disparate Treatment of Nonqualified Preferred Stock:
Yet Another Tax Classification Nightmare, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 605, 614 (2001-2002) (“[S]he can
reinvest those deferred tax payments in an interest bearing investment, i.e., the time value of
money effect.”).  For example, during 2007, an individual who earned in excess of eight percent
on invested funds (compounded daily) would have profited from underpaying income taxes.
Each of the Revenue Rulings regarding the interest rate on tax underpayments for the four
calendar quarters in 2007 stated that the rate was eight percent (compounded daily).  Rev. Rul.
2006-63, 2006-52 I.R.B. 1143; Rev. Rul. 2007-16, 2007-13 I.R.B. 807; Rev. Rul. 2007-39,
2007-26 I.R.B. 1449; Rev. Rul. 2007-56, 2007-39 I.R.B. 668.
14. An “‘aggressive’ tax position” has a “low probability of success on the merits.”  Kyle
D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX
REV. 241, 263 (2007).
15. The IRS audited 2.87% of the federal income tax returns for individuals with an income
of $200,000 or higher in fiscal year 2007.  IRS, IRS Announces Consistent Progress in Services
and Enforcement: IRS Fiscal Year 2007 Enforcement and Services Results, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 17, 2008, at 3 [hereinafter 2007 Enforcement and Services Results], available at LEXSTAT
2008 TNT 13-10.
16. “Under government rules, tax returns are accepted as filed unless the IRS audits and
then challenges a return.”  DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH:  HOW THE WEALTHIEST
AMERICANS ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE (AND STICK YOU WITH THE BILL)
83 (2007).
The Texas Furniture King likely incurred no economic detriment for claiming
this outrageously aggressive tax position, except for attorneys’ fees to fight the
IRS,  and he could have dodged millions in taxes if the IRS had not audited12
or if the auditor had missed the issue.  Likewise, under current law, any other
taxpayer who underpays taxes, is caught on audit, but is not penalized, may
incur little or no economic detriment for filing falsely.13
Part I of this Article posits that unlike the working class and the poor,
wealthy taxpayers often have the opportunity to take aggressive tax positions.14
 Often the economic transactions of the wealthy are not subject to withholding
or information reporting, and their transactions are more likely to have
uncertain tax consequences.  Because the IRS annually audits less than three
percent of all taxpayers with income in excess of $200,000,  there is a ninety-15
seven percent chance that the IRS will never challenge a rich taxpayer’s
aggressive position.16
Part II asserts that our current tax penalty system is fault based because a
taxpayer generally can escape penalties if the taxpayer’s position had at least
a twenty percent chance of success, or the taxpayer relied on a tax advisor, or
the taxpayer filed in good faith.  In practice, this encourages the rich to pay
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
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17. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
18. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
19. Substantial legal scholarship emphasizes the importance of norms in influencing
taxpayer behavior.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric
Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan,
Signaling or Reciprocating?] (“When [people] perceive that other individuals are voluntarily
contributing to public goods [by paying taxes], most individuals are moved by honor,
generosity, and like dispositions to do the same.”); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340-44 (2001); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to
Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 602-03 (2007) (“The key to
[explaining taxpayer behavior] is ‘tax morale,’ the collective name for all the non-rational
factors and motivations—such as social norms, personal values and various cognitive
processes—that strongly affect an individual’s voluntary compliance with laws.”); Eric A.
Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1789
(2000) (emphasizing the importance of social norms in tax compliance, particularly a taxpayer’s
fear of being stigmatized as a “bad type” for failing to pay his or her fair share of taxes); Alex
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601,
601 (2007) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Costs of Norms] (considering the “darker side of social
norms,” including tacit understandings that allow or encourage tax avoidance).
XXOther scholarly articles emphasize economic motivations.  See James Andreoni, Brian Erard
& Jonathon Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998); Leandra
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
1453 (2003); Logue, supra note 14; Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:
Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) [hereinafter
Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment]; see also id. at 576-77 (listing other economic literature).
20. See Lederman, supra note 19, at 1465 (“[E]conomic models of tax compliance . . .
counsel extremely high sanctions . . . .”); id. (“[A]n audit rate of 1 percent would require a
$99,000 penalty [for a $1000 error] . . . .”); Logue, supra note 14, at 268.
21. Norms are “[i]nformal, legally unenforceable rules of behavior.”  Raskolnikov, Cost
of Norms, supra note 19, at 601.
22. See, e.g., Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?, supra note 19, at 377; see also Robert
less than their fair share.  Signs indicate that the government seldom imposes
tax penalties, and tax dodging is rampant.   As an example, even in an17
especially active year, the IRS only imposed the negligence penalty against
one of every 217,391 individual taxpayers, and only against one of every 2076
individuals audited.  18
Part III explains that scholars are divided into two camps and have not
proposed a comprehensive, viable monetary penalty system.   On the one19
hand, scholars who emphasize that economic considerations motivate taxpayer
behavior tend to propose outrageously high monetary penalties that would be
politically unfeasible for the government to enact or enforce.   On the other20
hand, scholars who emphasize that norms —such as the desire to contribute21
to the common good—control taxpayer behavior, tend to ignore monetary
penalties or maintain that any strengthening of monetary penalties will
exacerbate tax dodging.22
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J. Wood, Accuracy-Related Penalties: A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309, 322 (1991).
23. I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2008).
24. This Article considers aggressive tax filing, not fraudulent or criminal tax behavior.
See infra Part II.  When a taxpayer’s behavior crosses the line from negligent to fraudulent, the
penalties are more severe.  A taxpayer guilty of civil fraud is subject to a penalty of seventy-five
Part III then challenges the essential foundation of the current penalty
system by considering whether the government should design tax penalties
on concepts of fault as in a negligence system, or on a strict liability basis,
and reaches a novel conclusion.  Because of the complexity of the federal
income tax, the low risk of audit, and other features, this Article asserts that
any fault-based monetary penalty system will fail.  As evidence, this Article
explores the largely ignored tendency of judges to disregard specific statutory
or regulatory directions to estimate the odds of success for a disputed tax
position and instead to create new judicial doctrines that excuse taxpayer
failures whenever the tax issue is novel or otherwise uncertain. 
As a result, Part IV proposes a new strict liability style penalty system,
featuring a false-filing-without-disclosure penalty.  Although this proposal
presumes that some taxpayers, at least in part, are motivated by economic
considerations, it also acknowledges the importance of norms.  Specifically,
this Article asserts that by drawing on both normative and economic factors,
a monetary penalty at a reasonable rate, such as twenty-five percent, can
influence taxpayer behavior.
Part IV also introduces features of the proposal that avoid the harshness
that would result from a pure strict liability approach.  For example, a
taxpayer who genuinely desires to file accurately but faces uncertainty could
disclose the uncertainty in detail, on a separate form, when filing the tax
return.  While this likely would ensure an IRS audit, in exchange the taxpayer
would be immune from penalties as long as the position was not frivolous.
Also, the proposal includes a graduated penalty rate.  Tax underpayments up
to $5000 would only be subject to a maximum five percent penalty, and any
tax underpayments from $5000 to $10,000 would only be subject to a
maximum ten percent penalty.  Current law imposes a flat twenty percent
penalty.23
Part V anticipates potential challenges, and possible adjustments.
Appendix A provides a proposed statute for the new false-filing-without-
disclosure penalty.
I. The Current System Allows and Encourages the Rich to File Aggressively
Self-assessment, complexity, and the audit lottery all allow the wealthy to
file aggressively, not accurately.24
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percent of the tax underpayment.  Id. § 6663(a).  “[F]raud mean[s an] actual, intentional
wrongdoing, and the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be owing.”
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941), quoted in MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶7B.02[3], at 7B-17 (2d ed. 2004).  In addition, there are several
criminal penalties for tax violations.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (tax evasion is a felony, punishable
by up to five years in prison and a fine of $100,000).
25. For example, taxpayers receiving cash for selling goods or providing services are
usually on the honor system.  Technically, the tax law requires any person engaged in a trade
or business that pays over $600 in rent, compensation, or other income to file an information
return (Form 1099) to report the payment to the IRS.  I.R.C. § 6041(a).  However, for cash
payments, this rule likely is breached more than followed, in part because the penalty for a
failure to file an information return (Form 1099) is only $50.  See I.R.C. § 6721(a)(1).  The IRS
reports that sole proprietors who operate on a cash basis pay tax on less than twenty percent of
their income.  See infra note 103-04 and accompanying text.  Barter exchange transactions,
many offshore transactions, and various other arrangements provide similar opportunities.  See
Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (barter exchange); infra note 111 (offshore transactions); infra
notes 105-07 (other tax shelters). 
26. “Our complex and comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon
self-assessment and reporting, demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of
relevant information to the taxing authorities.”  United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 815 (1984); see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); see also Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency:  Achieving
the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2008).
27. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (1999). 
28. I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1).
29. Id. § 6042 (requiring information reporting on dividends); id. § 6049 (information
reporting on interest payments); id. § 6045 (information reporting on sales by brokers, including
real estate transactions). 
A. Self-Assessment
Our tax system often allows the rich to be on the honor system.   Courts25
and commentators customarily state that the federal income tax is self-
assessed.   The government leaves it to each taxpayer to file a complete and26
accurate tax return.   27
For the vast majority of the working class and the poor, however, self-
assessment is a myth.  On the income side, wages are subject to withholding,28
which requires the employer to deduct the taxes and pay the IRS before the
worker has a chance to file an annual income tax return.  Also, interest,
dividends, and proceeds from the sale of property are subject to information-
reporting rules, which require the payer to send the IRS a Form 1099 stating
the amount the taxpayer received before the taxpayer has a chance to file a tax
return.   If the worker or recipient fails to report part or all of the wages,29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/1
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30. SALTZMAN, supra note 24, ¶ 8.04[3], at 8-21 (“The [IRS] matches the information
returns (e.g., Forms W-2 and 1099) of some individual taxpayers with their income tax returns
to detect nonfiling or underreporting of income.”);  see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed
Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 n.13
(discussing the “dramatic effectiveness of withholding and information reporting in obtaining
compliance by payees . . . .”); Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 577 n.33
(“Withholding and reporting increase the probability of detection . . . to almost 100% . . . .”).
31. “Information reporting severely limits the scope for tax evasion on many significant
income and deduction items . . . .”  Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 821.  For example, the
government strictly regulates the amount of home mortgage interest that may be deducted
because any bank or other financial institution receiving at least $600 of mortgage interest on
any one mortgage in a calendar year must report the amount to the IRS on Form 1098.  I.R.C.
§ 6050H(a); see also id. § 170(f)(17) (documentation requirements for charitable contributions).
32. I.R.C. § 63(c).  In 2009, the standard deduction for a married couple filing jointly is
$11,400.  Rev. Proc. 2008-66, § 3.10, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107.  The amount for a single individual,
or a married person filing separately, is $5700; for a head of household the amount is $8350.
Id.  
33. I.R.C. § 63(c).  An individual who claims the standard deduction merely deducts a fixed
amount, see supra note 32, rather than deducting state and local taxes, home mortgage interest,
charitable contributions, employee work expenses, and other itemized deductions.
34. Gerald Prante, Most Americans Don’t Itemize on Their Tax Returns, FISCAL FACTS (Tax
Foundation), July 23, 2007, http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/22499.html (only
17.92% itemize deductions).
35. The penalty for failing to file an information return is only $50.  I.R.C. § 6721(a)(1);
see supra note 25.  However, a decision not to file may greatly assist an owner, director,
important supplier, or other insider trying to dodge a tax liability.  See Lederman, supra note
30, at 737 (“Transacting with a familiar party is . . . . a red flag that . . . the parties might not be
acting independently . . . and . . . that the government cannot free ride on their independence .
. . .”). 
36. Prante, supra note 34, at 4 (93.34% itemize deductions).
37. Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 821.
interest, dividends or sale proceeds on the tax return, the government’s
computer-matching program will promptly send a bill for the tax deficiency.30
On the deduction side, the working class and the poor have little discretion
in claiming deductions because of documentation requirements  and the31
standard deduction.   A taxpayer who claims the standard deduction cannot32
claim any itemized deductions,  and over eighty-two percent of taxpayers with33
adjusted gross income below $50,000 use the standard deduction.  34
Frequently the wealthy can influence whether the payer files an information
return (Form 1099)  and the amount reported.  On the deduction side, “over35
[ninety-three] percent of [taxpayers] with an [adjusted gross income] greater
than $200,000 itemized.”   “[S]tatistics indicate that itemizers engage in36
significantly more [tax] evasion than nonitemizers.”   In addition, third-party37
reporting or stringent documentation requirements do not apply to many of the
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38. Record-keeping requirements apply to travel, transportation, entertainment, meals, and
lodging expenses. See I.R.C. §§ 274, 280F.  In contrast, taxpayers may simply estimate and
deduct the amount of other expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.  I.R.C. § 162(a)
(allowing a deduction for business expenses); Cohan v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 743, 761 (1928),
aff’d and rev’d, 39 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1930); see Ira B. Stechel, Travel and
Transportation Expenses – Deduction and Recordkeeping Requirements, 519-2nd Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) A-4 (“Cohan v. Comr. . . . allowed a court to approximate the amount of deductible
expenses incurred by a taxpayer . . . .”).
39. See infra Part II.C.2.
40. Justice Learned Hand said
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax . . . merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession:  cross-reference to cross-reference,
exception upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize
hold of—leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but
successfully concealed, [purpose] . . . .
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947), quoted in Jeffrey L.
Yablon, As Certain as Death—Quotations About Taxes, 110 TAX NOTES 103, 111 (2006).
Albert Einstein said, “[T]he hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax.”
Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), vacated 2006 WL 4005276,
quoted in Yablon, supra, at 108.
41. Commentators frequently identify three causes of complexity.  First, the income tax
attempts to measure the success of economic transactions, and the economic transactions of
wealthy individuals in the United States can be very complex.  Logue, supra note 14, at 249.
XXSecond, Congress seeks to achieve many social policy goals through tax incentives,
regardless of whether those tax incentives are consistent with sound tax policy.  Id.; see also
GRAETZ, supra note 1, at xi (“[O]ur current income tax is a mess because politicians ask it to
do too much . . . .  Presidents and members of Congress . . . seem to believe that an income tax
credit or deduction is the best prescription for every economic and social problem our nation
faces.”).
XXThird, Congress and the Treasury Department adopt many tax laws to close tax loopholes
or to address tax-saving transactions created by taxpayers that have no economic substance.
“[The tax planner’s] cat-and-mouse game is to work the loopholes in the system until the
government finds them and draws them closed.”  David Cay Johnston, The Loophole Artist,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at SM18; see also Logue, supra note 14, at 248-51.
tax deductions claimed by the wealthy.   As a result, wealthy taxpayers can38
truly self-assess, and in some cases choose not to pay the correct amount of
tax.   39
B. Complexity
Another fundamental feature of the U.S. income tax is complexity.   The40
U.S. income tax is complex for several structural reasons that have been
explored in previous authorities.  41
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42. The tax rules tend to clearly define a taxpayer’s obligations for routine transactions,
such as performing services in exchange for compensation.  I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
43. Although the tax rules are clearer, preparing the tax return can be time consuming.  The
average taxpayer devotes 26.4 hours annually in connection with tax compliance and filing.  See
IRS, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 2008, at 89, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040.pdf. 
44. This Article assumes that IRS audit activity will remain relatively constant.  See infra
note 44 and accompanying text.  Arguments could be made to increase the audit rate.  The IRS
collects approximately $6 for every $1 it spends on enforcement.  Andreoni et al., supra note
19, at 822.  The IRS funding level, however, is very political.  See Lederman, supra note 19,
at 1456 (“Since the late 1990s, the political climate for the IRS generally has been one in which
hard enforcement is disfavored.”); Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 596
(“[R]esource constraints, political pressures, and general fiscal difficulties that are likely to
persist well into the future make a substantial increase in the probability of detection somewhat
unrealistic.”).  
45. The IRS audits 0.9% of all tax returns filed.  IRS, DATA BOOK 2007, OCT. 1, 2006 –
SEPT. 30, 2007, at 23 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databkrevised.pdf.
46. The IRS audits 2.87% of tax returns reporting income in excess of $200,000.  See 2007
Enforcement and Services Results, supra note 15.  
47. JOHNSTON, supra note 16, at 84. 
48. In most situations,
[p]articipants in exchange bargaining (that is, where one side’s gain is the other’s
loss) do not expect the first offer to be the final offer . . . .  Therefore, unless you
are operating in the exceptional setting in which the parties expect the best offer
first, it is counterproductive to make an offer intended for acceptance until there
has been an exchange of at least a few progressively more attractive proposals. 
ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, SETTLING FOR MORE:  MASTERING NEGOTIATING STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES 200 (1991).  
The wealthy tend to engage in more complex economic transactions, which
can involve uncertain tax results and again allow more discretion in filing.42
In contrast, the tax rules encountered by the working class and the poor tend
to be simpler and difficult to avoid.43
C. Audit Lottery
The risk that the IRS will audit a particular taxpayer is small.   Over ninety-44
nine percent of all individual income tax returns escape audit.   The IRS45
audits less than three percent of all returns filed by taxpayers with income in
excess of $200,000.   “[T]he vast majority of people who fudge[] on their46
taxes, or flat-out cheat[] . . . [get] away with it.”  47
The low risk of audit provides taxpayers, like the Texas Furniture King, an
opportunity to use their tax returns as a mere first offer.  Under standard
negotiating practices, when one party makes a first offer, that first offer is
substantially less generous than what the party will submit as a “best and final
offer” after extensive negotiations.   One reason is that the other side may48
simply choose not to negotiate and will accept the first offer.  That is precisely
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49. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 3 (“[T]he minimal requirement for a tax system should be that
it raises sufficient revenue to pay for government expenditures.”).
51. President John F. Kennedy said, “To the extent that some people are dishonest or
careless in their dealings with the government, the majority is forced to carry a heavier tax
burden.”  Yablon, supra note 40, at 160.  
52. In contemplating whether to claim a particular tax position, a taxpayer’s decision will
consider “the size of the penalty in the event of both detection and rejection.”  Logue, supra
note 14, at 245.  Even when the risk of detection is small, a penalty will deter an actor if the
penalty is set high enough.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 473-79 (2004).  
53. SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 474.
what happens when the IRS fails to audit a tax return, and ninety-seven percent
of the time, the IRS fails to audit the rich.49
D. Distributive Justice Problem
The federal income tax raises revenue to finance public goods, such as
national defense and the public highway system.   Because the government50
seeks a certain dollar amount in taxes, if one group pays less, another group
must pay more.   If the rich pay less than their fair share, the working class51
and the poor pay more.
II. The Current Fault-Based Penalties Fail to Discourage Aggressive Filing
Although self-assessment, complexity, and the audit lottery provide an
opportunity for wealthy taxpayers to avoid paying their fair share, a robust
penalty system could counterbalance those forces.  A stiff penalty for losing
can turn a smart play into a foolish gambit.   Unfortunately, the current fault-52
based penalty system fails.
A. Our Current System Is Fault Based 
Legal sanctions to deter behavior may be fault based, as in a negligence
system, or may use strict liability principles.   In a pure strict liability system,53
the actor is automatically liable for causing harm.  In contrast, in a fault-based
system, the actor who causes harm will only be liable if the actor failed to
fulfill certain duties, or if certain circumstances were present.  Currently, a
taxpayer who underpays is not automatically liable for a penalty.  Instead, the
taxpayer generally can avoid the penalty if (i) the tax position had at least a
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54. See infra Part II.A.1-3.
55. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., IRS Penalty Study: A Call for Objective Standards, 112 TAX
NOTES 1183, 1185 (2006) (“[Historically] classic tort theory defined noncompliant behavior.
Taxpayers were penalized only if their behavior rose to the level of negligence.”).
56. “The term negligence includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with
the provisions of the internal revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
preparation of a tax return.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1991).  “A return position that has
a reasonable basis as defined in [id. § 1.6662-3(b)(3)] is not attributable to negligence.”  Id.  The
courts define “negligence” for tax purposes as the failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily
prudent person would do under the circumstances.  See Barlow v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 714, 723
(6th Cir. 2002); Howard v. Comm’r, 931 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1991); Neely v. Comm’r, 85
T.C. 934, 947 (1985).
57. I.R.C. § 6662(c) (2008).  The penalty for “negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations” applies when the taxpayer’s position does not have a reasonable basis.  Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-3(b).  “The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely
arguable or that is merely a colorable claim.”  Id. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).  The Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation states that a tax position meets this standard if it has a “20 percent
likelihood of success if challenged.”  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, COMPARISON OF JOINT
COMMITTEE STAFF AND TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO PENALTY AND INTEREST
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 13 (No. JCX-79-99, 1999) [hereinafter JOINT
TAX COMMITTEE COMPARISON], available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdf; see also
Lavoie, supra note 26, at 20 (twenty percent standard); Logue, supra note 14, at 255 (twenty
percent standard).  
58. See Review of the Civil Penalty Provisions Contained in the Internal Revenue Code:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong.
17 (Mar. 31, 1988 and July 28, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Hearings] (statement of Dennis E. Ross,
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy), quoted in Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Vices and Virtues of an
Objective Reporting Standard, 112 TAX NOTES 1085, 1088 n.39 (2006) [hereinafter Ventry,
Vices and Virtues].  
twenty percent chance of success, (ii) the taxpayer relied on a tax advisor, or
(iii) the taxpayer filed in good faith.54
1. No Penalty if Taxpayer Had a Twenty Percent Chance of Success
The negligence penalty is the monetary sanction generally applicable for
taxpayers claiming aggressive tax positions.  Echoing the fault-based theory
of liability in tort,  the courts define tax negligence as the failure to do what55
a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the
circumstances.   56
Surprisingly, the tax negligence penalty teaches that a prudent taxpayer
would claim a tax deduction anytime the taxpayer has at least a twenty percent
chance of success.   In effect, in the tax world, you are acting prudently if57
there is an eighty percent chance that you are wrong.  As a result, “a
negligence . . . standard places relatively little tension on a taxpayer’s decision
to take an aggressive position . . . .”   The penalty is a flat twenty percent of58
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59. I.R.C. § 6662(a).  Thus, if the aggressive tax position caused a $1000 tax
underpayment, the penalty would be $200.
60. Id. § 6662(d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(b)(1) (1991).  
61. Also, the substantial understatement penalty only applies if the tax underpayment
exceeds $5000.  I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
62. Id. § 6662(d)(1)(A).  A taxpayer is not subject to the substantial understatement penalty
for a tax return position that has “at least a 40 percent likelihood of success if challenged.”
JOINT TAX COMMITTEE COMPARISON, supra note 57, at 14; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(I); Lavoie, supra note 26, at 20 (forty percent standard); Logue, supra note 14, at 254,
291 (forty percent standard). 
63. Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1090 (quoting 1988 Hearings, supra note
58, at 38 (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy)).
Arguments that the “substantial understatement” penalty is a “no fault” penalty are fallacious.
In discussing the substantial understatement penalty, former IRS Commissioner Gibbs pointed
out that a taxpayer’s position can be wrong, and the taxpayer can avoid the penalty, and Gibbs
concludes, “it is difficult for me to understand how that is no-fault.” Id. at 1090 n.53 (quoting
1988 Hearings, supra note 58, at 37 (statement of former IRC Commissioner Lawrence Gibbs)).
In addition, another former IRS Commissioner stated, “‘No-fault’ . . . was the wrong label to
put on [the substantial understatement penalty].”  Id. at 1090 (quoting 1988 Hearings, supra
note 58, at 166 (statement of former IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander)).  Former IRS
Commissioner Egger agreed, stating, “Rather, the ‘more accurate description’ . . . ‘would be a
penalty on undisclosed aggressive positions that are wrong.’” Id. (quoting 1988 Hearings, supra
note 58, at 153 (statement of former IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger, Jr.)).  Also, the
substantial understatement penalty is fault based because a taxpayer will not be liable for the
penalty if she filed in good faith.  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
64. Two situations require a taxpayer to satisfy a “more likely than not” standard.  First,
in the case of a “tax shelter,” the penalty will apply unless “the taxpayer reasonably believed
that the tax treatment of such item was more likely than not the proper treatment.”  I.R.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(II); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1)(i)(B).  A “tax shelter” includes “any . . . plan
or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such . . . plan[] or arrangement is the avoidance or
evasion of Federal income tax.”  I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).  Second, in the case of a reportable
transaction, a penalty will not apply if “the taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment
was more likely than not the proper treatment.”  Id. § 6664(d)(2)(C).  In addition, a tax return
preparer may be subject to a penalty unless she had a “reasonable belief that the position would
the tax underpayment caused by the negligent position.  59
Other probabilities of success apply in special situations.  For example, the
“substantial understatement penalty”  applies when the erroneous tax position60
triggers a tax underpayment that exceeds ten percent of the total tax required
to be shown on the taxpayer’s return.   The taxpayer must have had at least a61
forty percent, rather than a twenty percent, chance of success to avoid the
substantial understatement penalty.   This penalty is fault based, in part,62
because the “[f]ailure to have [at least a forty percent chance of success for a
position claimed] should be seen as fault . . . .”63
In certain narrowly defined circumstances, the taxpayer must satisfy a fifty
percent standard to avoid a penalty.64
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more likely than not be sustained on its merits . . . .”  Id. § 6694(a)(2)(B).
65. Id. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (1991).  Also, this exception is available
when the substantial understatement penalty otherwise would apply.  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).  
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1). 
67. Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1088.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).
69. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 20.1.1.3.1.2.1 (2008) [hereinafter INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL], available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-001.html (other
facts and circumstances to consider include “[t]he taxpayer’s education[,] . . . if the taxpayer has
been penalized before, . . . [and] [t]he level of complexity of a tax or compliance issue.”).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
71. “[T]he taxpayer must furnish the advisor with all necessary and relevant information
to make a determination.”  Alan J. Tarr & Pamela J. Drucker, Civil Tax Penalties, 634-2nd Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) A-157 (citations omitted).  The tax advisor must base the advice on “all pertinent
facts and circumstances and the law.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i).  The advisor cannot base
the advice on “unreasonable factual or legal assumptions” or an unreasonable representation by
the client.  Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii).  Also, the advisor must have “knowledge in the relevant
aspects of Federal tax law.”  Id. § 1.6664-4(b)(2) (Example 1); id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).  In addition,
the advice must set forth the analysis.  Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(2).
72. An opinion letter from a tax advisor is a “[v]irtual insurance policy against the
imposition of penalties . . . .”  Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1090.
2. No Penalty Because of a “Good Faith” State of Mind
Even if a taxpayer’s position did not have at least a twenty percent chance
of success, the taxpayer still will avoid the negligence penalty if the tax return
was filed in “good faith” with “reasonable cause.”   The inquiry includes65
“[a]ll facts and circumstances.”   Thus, to impose the negligence penalty, “the66
IRS [must] establish the taxpayer’s state of mind, a tricky proposition.”   The67
regulations expressly provide that “an honest misunderstanding of fact or law”
qualifies the taxpayer for penalty immunity.   Indeed, “[r]easonable cause68
may be established if the taxpayer shows ignorance of the law in conjunction
with other facts and circumstances.”  69
3. No Penalty Because of Reliance on a Tax Advisor
Furthermore, a taxpayer is immune from penalties even if the tax position
did not have a twenty percent chance of success, as long as the taxpayer “relied
in good faith on advice (including the opinion of a professional tax advisor)
as to the [tax] treatment.”  70
This immunity basically is available if the tax advisor performs a thorough
job,  which often generates a significant fee.  As a result, wealthy taxpayers71
with the opportunity to save substantial taxes by taking aggressive positions
can purchase penalty insurance from tax advisors.   72
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73. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1940-41 (2005).  
74. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2), (3) (2008).
75. Id. § 6651(a)(3).  If the tax due is less than $100,000, the payment window is twenty-
one days, rather than ten days.  Id.
76. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 2336 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027 (“[Because]
the current cost of borrowing money is substantially in excess of the [six] percent interest rate
provided by the [Internal Revenue Code], it is to the advantage of taxpayers in many cases to
file a return on the due date but not to pay the tax . . . .”).
77. Today the interest rate is a floating rate set at three percent above a rate periodically
established by the federal government.  I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2); see also id. § 6601(a) (charging
interest at the rate in I.R.C. § 6621).
78. JOINT TAX COMMITTEE COMPARISON, supra note 57, at 11 (indicating that the interest
paid by taxpayers on tax underpayments renders the failure-to-pay penalty unnecessary).
This immunity for reliance on a tax advisor has been crucial for the growth
of the tax shelter industry.  “The solution [to the risk of civil penalties] has
been for the tax shelter promoter to obtain and furnish to the taxpayer . . . an
opinion of independent tax counsel . . . .”73
4. The Failure of the Failure-to-Pay Penalty
In addition to the negligence penalty, the current system includes a failure-
to-pay penalty.   Unfortunately, this penalty also fails to deter aggressive74
behavior.  Despite its name, the IRS typically does not impose the failure-to-
pay penalty when a taxpayer fails to pay the correct amount of tax.  
The failure-to-pay penalty only applies if a taxpayer fails to pay within ten
days of receiving an IRS notice demanding payment after all of the taxpayer’s
appeal rights have expired.   Thus, a taxpayer can file aggressively; wait to75
see if the IRS audits; refuse to pay the amount in controversy until all chances
of appeal expire, and still avoid the failure-to-pay penalty simply by paying the
deficiency within ten days of receiving the IRS’s notice of demand for
payment.  
Its purpose was to correct an interest rate problem.  Congress enacted the
penalty in 1969 to discourage taxpayers from taking advantage of the
artificially low interest rate charged by the IRS on tax underpayments.76
Congress subsequently eliminated the fundamental problem when it provided
for a floating interest rate on tax underpayments.  Accordingly, the77
Congressional Joint Tax Committee recommends the repeal of the current
failure-to-pay penalty.  78
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79. See IRS, SOI Tax Stats – IRS Data Book, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=
102174,00.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter IRS, SOI Tax Stats] (tables indicating
“Civil Penalties Assessed and Abated, by Type of Penalty and Type of Tax,” for the years 1995
through 2004).  The IRS also published statistics on the imposition and waiver of the negligence
penalty against corporations.  Id.
80. The following chart summarizes the statistics (for individual taxpayers) from the IRS
Data Books for the fiscal years 1998 through 2004.
(1) (2) (column 1 minus column 2)
Year Times Negligence
Penalty Assessed
Reasonable
Cause Waivers
Times Negligence
Penalty Imposed
2004 395 53 342
2003 425 118 307
2002 576 109 467
2001 548 274 274
2000 642 306 336
1999 656 527 129
1998 1,465 892 573
Total 4,707 2,279 2,428
Avg. Per Year 672 325 347
These statistics are from the IRS Data Book for each year.  IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 79.
In particular, the statistics from 2002 through 2004 are from Table 27, Civil Penalties Assessed
and Abated, by Type of Penalty and Type of Tax, for the applicable year.  The same table of
information was numbered differently for the earlier years.  In 2001 and 2000, it was Table 26;
in 1999 it was Table 29; in 1998, it was Table 28. 
B. Fault-Based Penalties Are Rarely Imposed
Statistics and reported cases demonstrate that the IRS and the courts rarely
impose the current fault-based penalties.
1. Statistics Evidencing the Failure to Impose Penalties
Through 2004, the IRS published statistics each year on the number of
times it assessed the negligence penalty, and the number of times a court, or
the IRS, waived an assessed negligence penalty under the “reasonable cause”
exception.   On average, for the seven-year period ending in 2004, the IRS79
assessed the negligence penalty only 672 times per year, and a court or the IRS
waived an assessed negligence penalty 325 times per year.   Even during its80
most aggressive year during that period, the IRS only imposed the negligence
penalty against one out of every 217,391 individual taxpayers who filed a
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81. The “Times Negligence Penalty Imposed” column below (column (1)) is taken from
the chart in supra note 80.
Year
(1)
Times Negligence
Penalty Imposed
(2)
Total Indiv Tax
Returns Filed
(in thousands)
(3) 
Percentage of
Total Tax R eturns
Penalized
(col. 1/col. 2)
(4)
Total Tax
Returns Audited
(in thousands) 
(5)
Percentage of
Audited Returns
Penalized
(col. 1/col. 4)
2004 342 130,134 .00026% 997 .0343%
2003 307 130, 341 .00023% 849 .0362%
2002 467 129,441 .00036% 743 .0628%
2001 274 127,097 00022% 731 .0375%
2000 336 124,877 .00027% 617 .0544%
1999 129 125,227 .00010% 1,100 .0117%
1998 573 123,000 .00047% 1,192 .04807%
       
Total 2,428 890,117 6,229
Avg. 347 127,160 .00027% 890 .0390%
 
These statistics are from the IRS Data Book for each year.  IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 79.
In particular, the statistics from 2000 through 2004 are from Table 10, Examination Coverage:
Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax After Examination, by Type and
Size of Return.  For 1998 and 1999, the same table information is at Table 15.
XXIn the 1998 tax year, the IRS imposed the penalty against approximately one out of every
217,391 taxpayers who filed a return (1/.0000047 = 217,391), and against approximately one
out of every 2076 individuals audited (1/.000481 = 2,076).
82. See Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related
Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 139 (2001) (reporting that if one ignores the times when the
penalty is waived for “reasonable cause,” the penalty is assessed against “one for every 1,000
individual returns that the IRS says it looked at and a bit more than one for every 100,000
income tax returns filed”).
83. But see id. at 138-39 (indicating that the IRS Data Books for the tax years 1995 through
1998 provided information on the “accuracy penalties” and that separate statistics are not
provided for the negligence penalty and the substantial understatement penalty).  
84. For example, for 2005, Table 27, titled “Civil Penalties Assessed and Abated, by Type
of Tax and Type of Penalty, Fiscal Year 2005” does not include a separate line for either the
negligence penalty or the substantial understatement penalty, but instead includes a single line
titled “accuracy.”  IRS, SOI Tax Stats, supra note 79.  Note 1 of that Table provides that the line
titled “accuracy” includes “penalties for negligence; substantial understatement of income tax;
federal income tax return, and the IRS imposed the penalty against only one
out of every 2076 individuals audited.   These statistics are consistent with81
similar numbers for 1994 through 1998.   Unfortunately, the IRS does not82
provide statistics regarding the substantial understatement penalty,  and the83
statistics provided after 2004 mix the negligence penalty, the substantial
understatement penalty, and several other penalties.  84
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substantial valuation misstatement; substantial overstatement of pension liabilities; substantial
estate or gift tax valuation understatement . . . and understatement of reportable transactions .
. . .”  Id.  In 1989, Congress consolidated the negligence penalty and four other penalties into
a group called the “accuracy-related penalties.”  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 102 Stat. 2106 (1989); I.R.C. § 6662(b) (2008) (setting forth the five
accuracy-related penalties).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C) (1991).  
86. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87. The Treasury Regulations provide a list of the types of items that a judge may consider
as authority.  Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
88. The judge determines the “weight” to give to each item of authority based on its
“relevance[,] . . . persuasiveness, and the type of document providing the authority,” id. §
1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii), and the judge must determine the various weights “in light of the pertinent
facts and circumstances,” id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
89. Id. 
90. If the judge determines that the taxpayer did not have substantial authority, the judge
can still waive the penalty if the taxpayer acted in “good faith” and had “reasonable cause” for
taking the tax position.  I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).  Taxpayers frequently argue that their reliance on
a tax advisor constitutes reasonable cause.  See Tarr & Drucker, supra note 71, at A-156 to A-
158 (discussing several tests that judges may apply to determine if the taxpayer’s reliance on
a tax advisor constituted reasonable cause for the incorrect tax position).  
2. Courts Create Exceptions That Excuse Taxpayers Faced with
Uncertainty
Under current law, judges often refuse to penalize a taxpayer despite IRS
arguments to the contrary.  A judge required to determine whether a fault-
based penalty applies, based on a probability that the taxpayer’s position
would succeed, must make difficult determinations.  First, the judge must
evaluate the tax law at two different moments—(i) at the time the taxpayer
filed the tax return, and (ii) “on the last day of the taxable year to which the
return relates.”   Second, the judge must determine, as of those two moments,85
the odds that the taxpayer’s position would prevail.86
The Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations set out detailed
rules to follow in applying certain penalties.  As an example, the rules for the
substantial understatement penalty include: a list of the types of authorities,
including cases and IRS rulings, that may and may not be considered in
determining the strength of the taxpayer’s position;  rules on how to assign87
a “weight” to each applicable authority;  rules on how to balance all the88
applicable authorities in deciding the odds that the taxpayer’s position would
win;  and if the taxpayer’s position did not have at least a forty percent chance89
of success, how to determine whether the taxpayer acted in “good faith” or had
“reasonable cause” for making the mistake.90
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91. One author wrote, “Out of the hundreds of Tax Court cases involving the substantial
authority standard that have been decided since the adoption of the substantial understatement
penalty [in 1982], the legal researcher can count on his fingers the cases in which any
meaningful consideration is given the application of the standard.”  Merrill Glenn Jones II,
Note, Osteen v. Commissioner: In Search of a Workable Test for Substantial Authority in “All
or Nothing” Substantial Understatement Penalty Tax Cases, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185,
1206 (1996).  That article has not been cited by subsequent scholars (as of June 17, 2009).
92. Berger v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3144, 3148 (1994); Estate of Bradley v. Comm’r,
74 T.C.M. (CCH) 210, 219 (1977) (stating that no penalties applied because the tax result
turned on “complex and inter-related contractual documents”). 
93. Crawford v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540, 2552 (1993) (concluding that a penalty
should not be imposed on certain adjustments because there was “confusion” about the law);
Unger v. Comm’r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1162 (1990), aff’d 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Not surprisingly, the Tax Court has also held that the negligence penalty does not apply if the
law is unsettled.  See Hummer v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 657, 661 (1988) (“[A]t the time
[taxpayer] filed his [tax] return . . . the law was still sufficiently unsettled and uncertain that .
. . [the taxpayer], a lay person with no particular tax background or knowledge, cannot be said
to have been negligent . . . .”); see also Tarr & Drucker, supra note 71, at A-30. 
94. Booth v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 524, 578 (1997) (emphasis added). 
95. Osteen v. Comm’r, 62 F.3d 356, 358-59 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).  Osteen
considered whether the taxpayers were engaged in farming and horse breeding operations as a
business or as a hobby.  Id.  This is a fact specific tax issue.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed
the Tax Court’s imposition of the substantial understatement penalty.  Id. at 360.  The Eleventh
Circuit stated that because the record contained evidence for both the taxpayers’ position and
the IRS’s position, “[o]nly if there was a record upon which the Government could obtain a
reversal under the clearly erroneous standard could it be argued that from an evidentiary
standpoint, there was not substantial authority for the taxpayer’s position.”  Id. at 359 (emphasis
added); see also Streber v. Comm’r, 138 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1998) (following Osteen). 
96. Williams v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 144, 153-54 (2004) (emphasis added).
97. Courts use at least five other judicially created excuses.  First, there was “no prior
relevant authority contrary to [the taxpayer’s] position,” Dunnegan v. Comm’r, 1996-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,234, at 83,877 (3d Cir. 1996), and the taxpayer’s position was “arguably
supportable,” id. at 83,878.  Second, the taxpayers “reasonably believed” that their tax treatment
was proper.  Wimpie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2091, 2096 (1994).  Third, the
authority was “a somewhat confusing mix” on the issue.  Peerless Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 1994-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,043, at 83,175 (D.C. Pa. 1994), available at 1994 WL 13837, at
*10.  Fourth, the taxability turns on the facts, and there were “some factors” supporting the
Although the statute and regulations provide these incredibly detailed rules,
in many cases courts abandon any type of structured analysis and create their
own standards.  While the trend has gone largely unnoticed in the legal
scholarship,  judges have deftly avoided their role as odds-makers by creating91
a string of judicial exceptions.  The courts have let taxpayers who filed falsely
escape the penalty by inventing the following excuses: the transaction was
complicated;  the law was unsettled;  the issue was “novel”;  the taxpayer’s92 93 94
position was not “clearly erroneous”;  the taxpayer’s position was “reasonably95
debatable”;  and at least five other judicially created excuses.96 97
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taxpayer’s position.  Highland Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 237, 257 (1996) (noting
that a key fact was the “intent of the parties”).  Fifth, the issue turns on a case-by-case analysis
of the facts, including the intent of the taxpayer, and there are “few bright lines to guide
taxpayers and tax practitioners.”  Jorgl v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318, 1327 (2001), aff’d
per curiam, 264 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 2001). 
98. David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 331 (2007) (“Tax
shelters have proliferated in the United States [because of several factors, including] . . . the
inadequacy of tax penalties . . . .”).
99. Press Release, Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, A Comprehensive
Strategy for Reducing the Tax Gap 5 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at  http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/otptaxgapstrategy%20final.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, Office of Tax
Policy].
100. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, FS-2005-14 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
article/0,,id=137246,00.html (“For Tax Year 2001, all taxpayers paid $1.767 trillion on time,
a figure that represents from 83.4 percent to 85 percent of the total amount due.”).  The tax gap
was $345 million in 2001.  I.R.S. News Release IR 2007-137, supra note 1; see also Dustin
Stumper, Everson Pledges to Narrow Growing Tax Gap, 110 TAX NOTES 807, 807 (2006).  IRS
audits likely will reduce the final tax gap to approximately $290 billion.  See I.R.S. News
Release IR 2007-137, supra note 1.  The tax gap is defined as the “amount of true tax liability
imposed by law for a given tax year that is not paid voluntarily and timely.”  IRS, REDUCING
THE FEDERAL TAX GAP:  A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 6 (2007),
available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf. 
101. Unfortunately, the IRS does not provide estimates on how taxpayers at different income
levels contribute to the tax gap.  See I.R.S. News Release IR 2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005) available
at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137247,00.html; Press Release, Policy, supra note
99, at 5.
XXHowever, in 2008 a congressional subcommittee reported that offshore tax abuses cost the
U.S. Government $100 billion in taxes every year.  PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE, STAFF REPORT:  TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX
COMPLIANCE, 108th Cong., at 5 (July 17, 2008) [hereinafter REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS],
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.  It seems likely that the
wealthy would use offshore tax tricks more often than the working class or the poor.  In
addition, the precise contribution of the wealthy to the tax gap depends on the definition of the
wealthy.  Reports indicate that tax underpayments by small businesses and sole proprietors
account for a substantial portion of the tax gap.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see
also Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 575 (“According to many estimates,
C. Failure to Deter Aggressive Taxpayer Behavior
This failure of the penalty system contributes importantly to an overall tax
compliance crisis, evidenced by the so-called “tax gap” and other signs.   The98
“tax gap” is the difference between the amount of taxes people should pay, and
the amount they actually pay.   The IRS estimates that taxpayers only pay99
approximately eighty-five percent of the taxes they owe.   As the working100
class and the poor must pay their fair share because of withholding,
information reporting, and other structural features, much of the fifteen percent
tax gap likely could be traced to the wealthy.   101
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the largest portion of the tax gap is due to underreporting of income by small businesses and
self-employed individuals, most of which falls under the rubric of tax evasion. . . .  A recent
report attributes 67% of the tax gap to this type of evasion.”).  As this Article has described the
wealthy to include all individuals with income over $200,000, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text, which likely includes many sole proprietors, for purpose of this Article, a
large portion of the tax gap likely can be traced to the wealthy.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. The $350 Billion Question: How to Solve the Tax Gap:  Hearing Before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, 109th Cong., at 8 (2005) (prepared testimony of Treasury Inspector
General J. Russell George) (footnote omitted), available at www.senate.gov/-
finance/sitepages/hearing041405.htm [hereinafter The $350 Billion Question].
104. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
105. Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 575.
106. Schizer, supra note 98, at 331.
107. S. REP. NO. 108-192, at 108 (2003) (emphasis added), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.183&filename=sr192.
pdf&directory=/diska/wais/data/108_cong_reports.
108. REPORT ON TAX HAVEN BANKS, supra note 101, at 4.  
Noncompliance is rampant among individuals operating a business,
particularly those receiving cash payments.  “[S]elf-employed individuals
operating businesses on a cash basis report just [nineteen] percent of their
income to the IRS.”   Noncompliance is widespread throughout the cash102
economy, which is approximately nine percent of the U.S. gross domestic
product.   Compliance is also an issue for non-cash sole proprietors because103
“self-employed individuals who . . . operate non-farm businesses are estimated
to report only about [sixty-eight] percent of their income for tax purposes.”104
In addition to the tax gap, there are other signs of a tax compliance crisis.
“[T]he tax shelter crisis is perhaps the most visible side of the tax compliance
problem . . . .”    “Tax shelters have proliferated in the United States [because105
of several factors, including] . . . the inadequacy of tax penalties . . . .”106
Congress is particularly concerned about abusive tax scams using offshore
bank accounts.  “For one scheme alone, the IRS estimates that there may be
hundreds of thousands of taxpayers with offshore bank accounts attempting to
conceal income from the IRS,”  and a government report states that “[e]ach107
year, the United States loses an estimated $100 billion in tax revenues due to
offshore tax abuses.”108
III. Bridging the Gap—A Monetary Sanction That Considers Norms
A. The Split, and the Gap, in the Academic Scholarship
Government officials, tax practitioners, and scholars agree tax avoidance is
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/1
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109. “One (and, perhaps, the only) good thing about tax avoidance is that it unites
theoretically inclined academics, hard-nosed practitioners, and result-oriented government
officials . . . [they all] believe that there is too much tax avoidance today.”  Raskolnikov, Crime
and Punishment, supra note 19, at 570.
110. See Posner, supra note 19, at 1807 (“[T]he high level of tax compliance is not
explained.”); id. at 1783-84 (“Why do people pay their taxes? . . . Only 1% are audited, but 83%
of taxes are paid.”).
111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
112. See Logue, supra note 14, at 267-68.
113. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
114. Logue, supra note 14, at 267 (“[T]he optimal fine for tax underpayments ought to be
the amount of [the] tax underpayment divided by the probability of detection.”).
115. Lederman, supra note 19, at 1466 (“[I]t is not politically realistic for the government
to impose . . . extremely high monetary penalties for tax evasion . . . .”).
116. See supra notes 19 and 22.
117. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?, supra note 19, at 377 (“[F]ar from promoting
compliance, simply increasing the penalties for evasion has been shown to undermine it, at least
in societies that otherwise enjoy relatively compliant norms.”); Kornhauser, supra note 19, at
618 (arguing that a procedure to “shame” taxpayers by publicly disclosing their tax
underpayments may actually “backfire” and decrease voluntary compliance).  But see
Lederman, supra note 19, at 1485 (asserting that the studies cited by Professor Kahan “do not
provide convincing support for [his] proposition”). 
rampant,  although some scholars wonder why taxpayers do not cheat more109
in light of the extremely low risk of an audit.110
The legal scholarship, which attempts to explain or improve taxpayer
behavior, can be divided along a spectrum, with an emphasis on economic
motivation on one end, and an emphasis on motivation inspired by norms on
the other.   The economic camp begins with the assumption that taxpayers111
will file aggressively if the expected benefit in tax savings exceeds the cost.112
Because audit rates are so low, this group suggests that the government should
impose extremely high penalties to influence behavior.  For example, as the
chance the IRS will audit is only one percent,  the penalty rate must be 100113
times the tax underpayment to deter aggressive tax filing.   However, it114
would not be politically feasible for Congress to enact, and for the IRS to
enforce, such an extreme approach.115
In contrast, the other camp asserts that taxpayers pay almost eighty-five
percent of their fair share of taxes because of a variety of norms, such as the
desire to contribute to the public good and to reciprocate in response to the fact
that other taxpayers generally comply.   These scholars warn that116
strengthening monetary penalties will send the wrong normative signal to
taxpayers and actually reduce taxpayer compliance.   The argument is that117
taxpayers are less likely to comply if the tax laws seem harsh or if the IRS
appears punitive and inflexible.
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118. See Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 579 (“Clearly, more
experimental results would be helpful in resolving theoretical debates.  In the meantime, the
best one can do, it seems, is to explicitly ground any proposal aimed at improving tax
administration in one of the competing views about taxpayer behavior.”).
119. “[S]ociety wants to make individuals and firms internalize the expected value of the
harm that their decisions might cause; harm, in this instance, would be the amount of under-paid
taxes.”  Logue, supra note 14, at 261.
120. Jeffrey Orenstein, Comment, Show Me the Money: The Suitability of Product
Disparagement to Art Experts, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 922 (2005) (“[T]he corrective
justice approach to tort law defines the principles under which it is justified to shift a loss from
one actor to another.”).  
XX[Under the conventional] economic analysis of tort law . . . cost internalization
through strict liability is well understood to achieve efficiency in certain settings
. . . .  For example, in the products liability context, if a product manufacturer is
trying to decide whether to manufacture and sell a particular product . . . [or] make
a particular safety innovation . . . the existence of a strict liability tort rule induces
that company ex ante to take into account the expected harm . . . .
Logue, supra note 14, at 261.
121. Id.; see supra Part I.D.
122. SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 474.
123. Id. at 476 n.4 (stating that under a fault-based system, “a party who commits an act and
As a result of this split, there is a gap.  We need a proposal for a monetary
penalty system imposed at a reasonable rate that can encourage accurate tax
filing.  Both normative and economic factors likely influence taxpayer
behavior, and the relative importance will remain a topic for research and
debate.   In the meantime, the monetary penalty system clearly is broken.  It118
should be revamped to properly leverage economic motivation without
ignoring norms.
B. General Criteria for Choosing Between Negligence or Strict Liability
The failure of the current monetary penalty system calls for a reevaluation
of the basic structure.  Laws designed to deter harmful behavior typically seek
to shift the harm to the actor.   For example, if an actor can choose an action119
that causes harm to third parties, tort law and other legal regimes often try to
shift the harm to the actor.   Because a taxpayer who underpays taxes harms120
the other members of society,  the legal system should impose a cost to deter121
that behavior.  
A legal system can use one of the “two basic forms of harm-based liability:
strict liability, and fault-based liability.”   Typically, policymakers consider122
certain factors in choosing the form.
On the one hand, fault-based legal regimes are appropriate when the act
does not always cause harm, when under certain circumstances the benefit
from the act likely will exceed the harm,  or if society prefers not to penalize123
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causes harm will be held liable if and only if [the expected harm exceeds the expected
benefit].”).
124. Id. at 477.
125. Id. at 474.
126. Id. at 475.
127. One might initially describe our current tax laws as a strict liability system because
when a taxpayer files aggressively, is caught on audit, and the IRS proves that the taxpayer paid
less than the lawful share, the government requires that the taxpayer pay the tax underpayment
plus interest.  Logue, supra note 14, at 290-91 (“[The current tax penalty regime] is a
combination of (1) strict liability with respect to back-taxes and interest and (2) a fault-based
system . . . for penalties.”) (emphasis added).  However, merely requiring the taxpayer to pay
the tax (and interest) if caught may leave the taxpayer in as good a position as if the taxpayer
filed accurately.  See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.  Given the extremely low risk
of audit, the absence of a meaningful economic penalty creates a huge incentive to file
aggressively, see infra note 239 and accompanying text, which has contributed to the crisis
discussed in Part II.C.  
128. Logue, supra note 14, at 261.
129. In all cases, the aggressive taxpayer’s tax savings will equal the tax revenue shortfall
experienced by society.
130. While it seems absurd, if one applied the fault-based concepts slavishly, presumably
a guilty taxpayer could argue that the tax underpayment generated numerous indirect benefits
to society.  See SHAVELL, supra note 52, at 476 (“Under [a fault-based] rule a party who causes
harm is liable and bears a sanction . . . only if the social authority finds that the expected harm
exceeded [the] expected benefits.”).  For example, a business owner underpaying taxes might
benefit society by hiring persons who otherwise would be unemployed, by purchasing
environmentally-friendly equipment, or by spending the tax underpayment which will increase
spending and grow the economy.
under certain circumstances (e.g., the actor is a volunteer).  Fault-based
liability systems can be difficult to apply because the judge must know, or
guess, “[the] likelihood and the benefit from the act”  and whether the special124
circumstances were present.  
On the other hand, a strict liability system always penalizes the actor when
the actor causes harm and is caught.   A strict liability system generally is125
easier to administer because “[t]he only information required by the [judge] is
the level of harm.”  126
These criteria indicate that for taxation a strict liability system is superior
for four reasons.   First, all aggressive filers caught on audit have harmed127
society.   Second, the direct benefit to the aggressive taxpayer never exceeds128
the cost to society.   Third, vexing administrative problems arise when judges129
are forced to consider the indirect benefit of each taxpayer’s aggressive
filing.   Fourth, as discussed in the previous section, additional problems130
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131. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing that judges create new excuses to avoid penalizing
taxpayers faced with any uncertainty).  
132. Logue, supra note 14, at 284.
133. See supra Part II.B.2.
134. See supra Part I.B. 
135. Lavoie, supra note 26, at 20.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 5 n.19. 
138. See supra Part II.B.2.
139. One standard that judges likely would be willing to apply is “frivolous.”  Courts often
apply the frivolous standard because various rules penalize parties in litigation for frivolous
positions or tactics.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (imposing sanctions for frivolous pleadings,
motions, and other filings); Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(imposing sanctions against plaintiff for filing frivolous actions).
arise if the judge must consider many other factors before imposing a
penalty.131
C. Any Fault-Based System Will Fail with the Federal Income Tax
In addition to these general factors, specific aspects of the federal income
tax system make any fault-based penalty system inappropriate.  As discussed
above, the current system allows three fault-based excuses.  Even if a
redesigned system includes just one, it likely would allow and encourage the
rich to file aggressively.  
1. Probability of Success Tests Force Judges to Act as Bookies and
Inspires Exceptions
An exception based on the probability of success of the taxpayer’s position
requires a judge to estimate the odds on a legal position.  Not only is the judge
asked to serve as a bookie, the judge acts as a bookie after the fact.  The judge
“[makes] an ex post assessment of the ex ante likelihood that the taxpayer
would ultimately succeed on the merits.”   As the current situation132
demonstrates,  judges will resist the role of odds-maker or bookie because the133
federal income tax system is complicated,  and assigning a percentage to a134
tax outcome “impl[ies] exactitude in an assessment that actually represents
only a general expectation regarding the outcome.”   Judges will conclude135
that “using percentages to define the strength of a legal position is always
fraught with some peril”  at best, and is a “fool’s errand at worst.”   As136 137
under current law,  judges would refuse to act as bookies and instead would138
create judicial tests which permit taxpayers to escape penalties whenever
uncertainty was present.139
Some may argue that although the twenty percent negligence standard, or
the forty percent substantial understatement standard, is problematic, a greater
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss1/1
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140. Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1091.
141. Congress has only adopted the more-likely-than-not standard for taxpayers in certain
narrow circumstances.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
142. See supra Part II.B.2.
143. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (emphasis omitted).  Boyle did not
involve reliance on substantive advice from a tax advisor.  Instead, the taxpayer was penalized
for a procedural mistake, namely the failure to file a tax return on time.  Id. at 243.
144. See supra Part II.A.1 (regarding the probability standards).
145. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 73, at 1941. 
146. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the
‘Should’ Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125, 1132 (2003) (discussing the “will succeed” opinion);
id. at 1126 (discussing the opinion that a tax position is not “frivolous”).  “The growing number
of [types of] legal opinion[s] . . . seems most pronounced in the area of tax opinions, due in part
to the IRS’s gradations of taxpayer positions for various penalt[ies] . . . .”  Id. at 1125.
than fifty percent standard, commonly called a “more-likely-than-not”
standard, would fix these problems.  One commentator has stated, “under the
elevated more likely than not standard, it would be nearly impossible for a
court to find against a taxpayer [on the merits] and at the same time
acknowledge that the taxpayer’s position was more likely than not correct.”140
While it is not certain how judges would react if greater than fifty percent
became the general standard,  the same forces that have led judges to adopt141
judicial exceptions  still would be applicable.  The income tax system still142
will be complex; judges still will be uncomfortable determining whether a
legal position had a certain percentage of success, even if that percentage is
fifty-one percent.  Additionally, judges still will not want to penalize a
taxpayer in the absence of a breach of a clear duty, and judges still will want
the discretion in particular cases to find that a taxpayer owes the tax but is not
liable for a penalty.
2. Reliance on a Tax Advisor Loophole Bails Out the Rich
The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta, has stated that “[w]hen an accountant or
attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability
exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice.”   Under current143
law, a taxpayer wishing to take an aggressive position can achieve penalty
immunity if the taxpayer can find a tax advisor who will say that the position
has at least a twenty percent chance, or a forty percent chance if the substantial
understatement penalty applies.   144
Tax advisors who need to pay the bills tend to issue opinion letters that
provide penalty protection to clients.   Indeed tax advisors have crafted145
twelve different standards to describe the likelihood of a tax position
succeeding, ranging all the way from “not frivolous” to “will succeed,”  in146
their efforts to adapt to whatever odds or standards a client needs to avoid
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147. See Schizer, supra note 98, at 360; Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1089.
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2008); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (1991).
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1); see supra Part II.A.2.
150. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2006) (granting these courts jurisdiction for certain tax cases).
152. See Andre L. Smith, Deferential Review of Tax Court Decisions of Law: Promoting
Expertise, Uniformity, and Impartiality, 58 TAX LAW. 361, 404 (2005) (“Circuit court judges
should not feel free to reverse experts such as Tax Court judges on matters that properly invoke
their expertise.”).
153. See Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of
Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 743 n.97 (2003) (“Today, the Claims Court has
no Judges with tax practice backgrounds of any magnitude.”).
154. “[A]bout 56 percent of all the individual tax returns filed for tax year 2002 used a paid
preparer . . . .”  Paid Tax Return Preparers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th
Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Michael Broster, Dir. of Strategic Issues), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06563t.pdf.
155. Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 616 n.189 (noting that “[eighty-
five percent] of all individual tax returns are prepared using computer software” (citing Allen
penalties.  Commentators describe the competition among tax advisors to issue
opinion letters as the “race to the bottom.”147
An exception for reliance on a tax advisor poses distributive justice
problems because it greatly benefits the rich.  Tax advisors need to charge fees
for their services, and rich taxpayers with big tax dollars at stake are more
likely than the working class or the poor to purchase tax opinions to provide
penalty immunity.
3. Good Faith State of Mind Exception Excuses False Filing
A system that grants immunity to taxpayers who file in “good faith”148
forces the judge to determine the taxpayer’s state of mind.   When149
performing the required psychoanalysis, given the complexity of the income
tax, a judge likely will be more inclined to say the taxpayer was confused,
rather than evil.
The term “penalty” carries substantial legal baggage.  In general, a
“penalty” is a “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer.”   Often judges150
deciding tax cases, such as Court of Claims judges and U.S. District Court
judges,  are not experts in tax law.   Even Tax Court judges who have tax151 152
expertise may not have a great deal of experience in the particular branch of
the tax law involved in a certain case.  Sometimes judges may not even have
enough confidence in their own knowledge of the tax laws to prepare their
own tax returns.   Like fifty-six percent of all United States taxpayers, the153
judge might use a paid tax advisor to prepare his or her personal income tax
return,  or like many of the remaining taxpayers, may rely on a computer154
program.   Under these circumstances, a judge may be reluctant to make a155
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Kenney, IRS Issues New Taxpayer-Burden Estimates, 108 TAX NOTES 1503, 1503 (2005)); see
also GRAETZ, supra note 1, at 14. 
156. See infra Part III.E.
157. Professor Raskolnikov states that “most models suggest that nominal penalties and the
probability of punishment play important roles in shaping taxpayer behavior.”  Raskolnikov,
Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 577.  He then discusses the literature arguing that
norms influence behavior and states, “In sum, experimental data lends some support to all
existing theories of taxpayer behavior, while giving a decisive advantage to none.”  Id. at 579.
158. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(“A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised [sic] by his
neighbor is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money . . . .”);
see Logue, supra note 14, at 244-45.
159. See Logue, supra note 14, at 244-45; Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of
Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your
Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003). 
160. Logue, supra note 14, at 245.
161. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of Utilitarianism, studied the impact of penalties on
behavior.  Gary Becker, the winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics, emphasized that
because actors weigh both the risk of detection and the potential penalty, “the best policy is to
maximize the fine and minimize surveillance [with limits].”  See id. at 266. 
162. See id. at 268; John D. Mueller, How Does Fiscal Policy Affect the American Worker?,
20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 563, 603 (2006).
finding of bad faith against a taxpayer and impose a penalty, unless the
taxpayer’s position is frivolous.  
D. Economic Considerations in Designing a Penalty System
1. Preliminary Economic Model
In designing a new penalty system, it is appropriate to consider taxpayer
motivations.  If taxpayers always behave virtuously without legal incentives,
penalties to deter wrongful actions are superfluous.  Often, penalty design
begins with a contrary assumption—that economic considerations are the sole
determinant of behavior.  While this can be a helpful start, eventually this
Article will expand the analysis to consider other factors  because normative156
factors also influence taxpayer behavior.   157
On the economic side, one can begin with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’
“bad man,”  who has been given the title “homo economicus.”   Economics158 159
alone motivates homo economicus.  He engages in socially harmful behavior
unless his total expected cost from behaving badly, including penalties, equals
or exceeds his total expected cost of behaving lawfully.  160
The works of utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and economist Gary Becker
provide a method for estimating the amount of the penalty necessary to deter
homo economicus.   The “Bentham-Becker”  method calculates the penalty161 162
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163. Logue, supra note 14, at 266.
164. See id. at 268 (Tax Savings/Risk of Detection = $1/1% = $100); see also Lederman,
supra note 19, at 1465 (“[E]conomic models of tax compliance . . . counsel extremely high
sanctions . . . .”); id. (“[A]n audit rate of 1% would require a $99,000 penalty [for every $1000
tax underpayment] . . . .”).  Nevertheless, even a purely economic analysis could be refined by
including factors other than the risk of audit.  For example, considering the chance that the
taxpayer would prevail on audit would reduce the potential cost.  On the other hand, potential
attorneys fees needed to battle with the IRS would increase the anticipated cost. 
165. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
166. In 2007, the audit rate was 2.87%.  2007 Enforcement and Services Results, supra note
15, at 3.
167. With a one percent risk of detection, the Bentham-Becker penalty is 100 times the cost
of filing accurately.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  With a three percent risk of
detection, the penalty is thirty-three-and-one-third times the cost of filing accurately.  See supra
note 45 and accompanying text.
168. If the goal is to force noncompliant taxpayers caught on audit to pay a big enough
penalty to reimburse society for all tax underpayments made by all taxpayers, whether or not
they are audited, the focus would be on the actual rate of audit, and the penalty rate would have
to be huge.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  Instead, the IRS and the U.S. Supreme
Court have both adopted the principle that the tax penalty system should improve taxpayer
“by dividing the harm caused by the probability of detection.”   In the federal163
income tax arena, if one merely uses the actual risk of audit for all individuals,
the Bentham-Becker method requires a staggering penalty rate. 
For example, assume the taxpayer is homo economicus.  He is considering
whether to claim a tax deduction and believes that if audited, the IRS and the
courts ultimately will disallow the tax deduction.  If he claims the tax
deduction on his tax return, he will save $1 in tax.  If the risk that the IRS will
audit is one percent, to deter Homo Economicus, the total cost to Homo
Economicus if the IRS detects would need to be $100.   Thus, with a one164
percent audit rate, the Bentham-Becker model teaches that the income tax
penalty should approximate ninety-nine times the tax underpayment.
2. Adjusting the Risk of Detection
This purely economic analysis can be adjusted somewhat because typically
the relevant risk of detection is higher.  First, although the audit rate for all
taxpayers is only one percent,  the audit rate for taxpayers earning over165
$200,000 is closer to three percent.   Under the Bentham-Becker model, the166
required penalty drops by almost two-thirds merely with this adjustment.  167
Second, it is the perceived risk of audit that will influence the taxpayer’s
behavior when completing a tax return.  The focus on the perceived risk of
audit, rather than the actual risk of audit, is based on the principle that the tax
penalty system should improve taxpayer compliance, rather than raise a
specified amount of revenue.   This focus is appropriate because “the direct168
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compliance.  The IRS Manual states, “In order to make the most efficient use of penalties, the
[Internal Revenue] Service will design, administer, and evaluate penalty programs based on how
those programs can most efficiently encourage voluntary compliance.”  INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL, supra note 69, at Exhibit 20.1.1-1 (Penalty Policy Statement 20-1), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/ch01s02.html#d0e2996, quoted in Raskolnikov, Crime and
Punishment, supra note 19, at 579 n.44.  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that civil tax
penalties “ensure full and honest disclosure [and] . . . discourage fraudulent attempts to evade
the tax.”  Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); see also Wood, supra note 22, at 320
(“Compliance . . . would seem to be the touchstone of sound civil penalty policy.”).  But see
Helvering, 303 U.S. at 401 (also noting that civil tax penalties “reimburse the government for
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s fraud”).  
169. Lederman, supra note 19, at 1462.
170. Posner, supra note 19, at 1808 (“People are apparently quite ignorant about the
probability that they will be audited . . . .”).
171. SALTZMAN, supra note 24, ¶ 8.03[3], at 8-22.
172. See id. ¶ 8.03, at 8-19.
173. Id. ¶ 8.03[2][b], at 8-20. 
174. Id. ¶ 8.03[2][a], at 8-19.
175. Andreoni, supra note 19, at 844-45.
176. The pessimists may believe in “Murphy’s Law,” which provides that “[i]f anything can
go wrong, it will.”  Murphy’s Laws Site, http://www.murphys-laws.com/murphy/murphy-
laws.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2009).
revenue from enforcement is a tiny fraction of the revenue from voluntary
compliance.”  169
In the real world, a taxpayer’s risk of audit does not depend solely on the
taxpayer’s amount of income, and taxpayers taking aggressive positions likely
will assume that their risk of audit is higher than the national average.   IRS170
examiners manually select some tax returns for audit,  but the IRS selects171
most audited returns using complex computer scoring procedures collectively
referred to as the Discriminant Function (the “DIF”).   The IRS changes the172
DIF periodically based on the results of the National Research Program which
identifies characteristics that signal tax underpayments.   The IRS keeps the173
DIF scoring procedures confidential.   As a result, one particular taxpayer174
can never be sure of the chance of being audited in any year.
In fact, “survey results suggest that people greatly overestimate the
probability of an IRS audit.”   A taxpayer who files aggressively may175
estimate that the chances of being audited are higher than the general
population, particularly because the taxpayer can never know the DIF score
and how that score compares to other taxpayers.  Also, when it comes to
income tax audits, many individuals may be pessimistic.   176
Thus, if an aggressive taxpayer believes the chance of being audited is four-
to-one, the Bentham-Becker formula calculates a penalty of only four times the
tax underpayment.  This rate is significantly lower than the one hundred times
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177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  The following chart demonstrates that as
the perceived risk of detection rises, the required penalty under the Bentham-Becker model
drops.
Perceived Risk
of Detection
Required
Penalty Factor
003% 33-1/3-to-1
010% 10-to-1
025% 4-to-1
050% 2-to-1
100% 1
The “required penalty factor” is one divided by the “perceived risk of detection.”  See Logue,
supra note 14, at 267 (“[T]he optimal fine for tax underpayments ought to be the amount of
[the] tax underpayment divided by the probability of detection.”).
178. Lederman, supra note 19, at 1466 (“[I]t is not politically realistic for the government
to impose . . . extremely high monetary penalties for tax evasion . . . .”).
179. Id.
180. Andreoni, supra note 19, at 855.
181. Posner, supra note 19, at 1791 (“[P]eople care about their reputations, and will take
steps to protect them.”); Andreoni, supra note 19, at 822.
182. Professor Posner emphasizes that if an aggressive taxpayer is detected, he may be
“revealed . . . to be a bad type, and [will be] stigmatized.”  Posner, supra note 19, at 1789.  The
consequences can include loss of employment opportunities and loss of income.  Id. at 1793.
However, Professor Posner points out that in a civil tax matter, as long as the taxpayer pays any
federal income tax deficiency promptly after the amount is finally determined and there is no
reported court opinion, the matter remains confidential, and no stigmatizing by third parties will
result.  Id. at 1796; see also Andreoni, supra note 19, at 822 (regarding stigmatizing).  
183. “The actual payment [of taxes] is a signal that one belongs to the good type.”  Posner,
supra note 19, at 1794.  
184. Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 855.
required with a one percent risk of detection.   Nevertheless, this still exceeds177
a penalty rate that Congress, or the general public, would find acceptable.178
The populace may perceive an excessive penalty rate as a punishment that
does not fit the offense.   Fortunately, norms also discourage taxpayers from179
filing aggressively.
E. Norms Reduce the Monetary Penalty Needed to Change Taxpayer
Behavior
Many norms encourage taxpayers to file accurately.  These norms include:
(i) a desire to avoid regret;  (ii) a fear of damage to reputation,  a fear of180 181
shame, or a fear of social stigma;  (iii) a desire to convince themselves and182
others that they are responsible and law abiding;  (iv) a sense of duty;  (v)183 184
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185. John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Taxes: Frames and Values, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 47 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“One of the most consistent findings in survey
research about taxpayer attitudes and behaviors is that those who [comply] believe that their
friends (and taxpayers in general) comply, whereas those who [cheat] believe that others
cheat.”), quoted in Lederman, supra note 19, at 1469; Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?,
supra note 19, at 368-69 (“[I]ndividuals in collective action settings behave . . . like moral and
emotional reciprocators.  When they perceive that other individuals are voluntarily contributing
to public goods, most individuals are moved by honor, generosity, and like dispositions to do
the same.” (footnote omitted)).
186. Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 610 (“A collectivist-oriented . . . individual will be more
willing to pay taxes . . . .  She will see paying taxes as a gain, fulfilling personal desires and
civic obligations and not just a loss of personal income.”).
187. Professor Posner points out that refusing to pay a state use tax on goods purchased from
out-of-state suppliers does not carry the same stigma as violating the federal income tax.
Posner, supra note 19, at 1794. 
188. Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 850.
189. Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 614 (discussing the taxpayer’s perceived level of
participation in government and the responsiveness of government officials); Andreoni et al.,
supra note 19, at 851.
190. Commentators have identified at least six factors.  First is perceived unfairness of the
system.  Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 851 (“The taxpayer may believe that the . . . tax
system treats him unfairly relative to others . . . .”).  Second is the perception that other people
are not paying their fair share of taxes.  If a taxpayer believes others are cheating and she files
honestly, she may feel like a “chump.” Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 613; see also Andreoni
et al., supra note 19, at 851 (“In psychological terms, an unfair tax system could lead people to
‘rationalize’ cheating.”).  Third is dissatisfaction with the way the government spends tax
dollars.  “[A] taxpayer [who] feel[s] ‘cheated’ . . . may reciprocate by refusing to pay [her] full
tax liability.”  Andreoni et al., supra note 19, at 851-52 (“[T]he higher the level of government
waste . . . the less the individual is willing to contribute.”).  Fourth is dissatisfaction with the
government as a whole.  Id. at 851 (In a survey, “participants whose responses . . . indicated an
alienation from government or a negative attitude toward laws were significantly more likely
to have engaged in evasion during the experiments.”).  Fifth is a desire to be a rebel or a
revolutionary.  Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 610.  Sixth is an anti-establishment world view.
Id. at 610-11 (“[A] Jeffersonian belief that small government is the best government” may
diminish compliance.).  
191. Id. at 610.
a belief that others pay their fair share of taxes, which inspires the taxpayer to
reciprocate;  and (vi) a desire to contribute to a collective enterprise.185 186
Other norms may either encourage or discourage accurate filing, depending
on the taxpayer’s particular views.  These norms include: (i) the perceived
fairness of the tax system;  (ii) the perceived fairness of the individual’s187
particular tax burden;  or (iii) satisfaction with government spending and188
programs.   There are also norms which discourage tax compliance.189 190
In addition, a legal rule itself may signal the appropriate behavior for
persons who desire to act in accordance with certain norms.  Individuals who
are “collectivist-oriented”  desire to convince themselves and others that they191
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192. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537,
1538 (2000) (“[C]hanges in law can influence social norms.  For example, passing a law against
smoking in public places had a dramatic effect on smokers . . . .”); Steven Shavell, Law Verses
Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AMER. L. & ECON. REV. 227, 254 (2002) (“[L]egal rules
can affect our moral beliefs, as well as the operation of the moral sanctions.”); Michael A.
Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and
Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 335 (2007) (“Within the field of scholars
interested in the ‘expressive’ function of law a number of theories have been proffered to
explain how law changes social norms.” (footnote omitted)).
193. Because tax return information is confidential, only the IRS can provide complete
statistical data on taxpayer compliance.  See I.R.C. § 6103(d) (2008).
194. “[T]he effective sanction is not just the tax penalty, but the sum of the tax penalty and
lost opportunities resulting from observers revising downward their beliefs about the violator’s
type . . . .”  Posner, supra note 19, at 1795 (second emphasis added).
195. The substantial understatement penalty only applies if the tax underpayment is $5000
or more (the greater of ten percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable
year or $5000).  I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
196. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.  However, if the IRS audits and a court
decides that the chance of success was less than twenty percent, the negligence penalty would
apply.  See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
are law-abiding, desire to avoid damage to reputation, or wish to reciprocate
if other members of society are acting in a certain manner; all may consider the
way the legal rules judge an action.   Legal rules are particularly important192
when complete information about how others act is unavailable or is not
known by the actors.193
The economic analysis of taxpayer behavior discussed above focused
exclusively on the risk of audit, but norms also can help deter a taxpayer from
filing aggressively.  Although the impacts of the various norms are inherently
difficult to quantify, many taxpayers will add these factors to a potential
monetary penalty when deciding how to act.   In determining the necessary194
monetary penalty to change taxpayer behavior, norms that encourage
compliance may allow a penalty at a reasonable rate to influence behavior.
For example, assume Connie Conscience and her tax advisors are working
on her individual tax return.  If she claims a tax deduction for a particular
payment, she will save $3000 on her income taxes.  As the amount involved
is not sufficient to trigger the substantial understatement penalty,  the195
applicable penalty under current law is the negligence penalty.  After
discussions with her tax advisor, Connie Conscience understands there likely
is a three percent chance that the IRS will audit her tax return,  and if the IRS196
audits there is a twenty-five percent chance (approximately) that the deduction
will succeed.  Because her position has a twenty-five percent chance, under
current law, the negligence penalty will not apply.   If the IRS audits and her197
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198. I.R.C. § 6601 (requiring that taxpayers pay interest on a tax underpayment); id. §
6621(b) (describing the method for calculating the amount of interest on a tax underpayment).
199. See supra note 13.
200. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (regarding the negligence penalty).
201. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this duty in 1950.  Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box
Co. of N.J., 338 U.S. 561, 565 (1950) (“[T]he taxpayer had a positive obligation to the United
States . . . to pay its tax.”); id. at 568 (“[T]he United States is to have the possession and use of
the lawful tax at the date it is properly due.”).
deduction ultimately is denied, Connie will have to pay only the $3000 tax
underpayment, plus interest at the government rate,  and will not have to pay198
a penalty.  If she claims the deduction, Connie will invest the $3000 tax
savings, and any economic detriment to Connie will be minimal.199
Connie Conscience values being a law-abiding citizen, contributing to the
common good, and doing the right thing.  Normally if she thinks there is a
seventy-five percent chance that refraining from an action is fair and just, and
that there is only a twenty-five percent chance that taking the action is
appropriate, she would not do it.  However, her tax advisor appropriately
points out that there is no sanction for claiming a tax position with a twenty-
five percent chance of success, and indeed the government expects that
persons in her position will claim this deduction.   Under these200
circumstances, Connie claims the deduction.
Replacement of the current fault-based negligence penalty with strict
liability might change Connie Conscience’s behavior.  In that case, the tax
advisor could no longer tell Connie that the government expects a reasonably
prudent person in her situation to take the deduction, or that if the IRS audits
she likely will not need to pay any penalty.  Instead, Connie now understands
that the tax law recognizes a duty to pay the correct amount of tax on time201
and that if the IRS audits and spots the issue there is a seventy-five percent
chance she will owe a monetary penalty, which she could have avoided if she
had not filed aggressively.  Connie also reflects that even if the IRS fails to
audit her tax return, her conscience will bother her because there will be a
seventy-five percent chance that she did not pay her fair share.  Connie
Conscious decides not to claim the deduction. 
IV. The Proposal:  The False-Filing-Without-Disclosure Penalty
This Article proposes the replacement of the current fault-based penalty
system with a new strict liability style system.  The new system would signal
that paying the correct amount of tax on time is an important duty.  It would
impose a penalty on any failure to pay the proper amount of tax with the
original filed tax return, with three exceptions.  
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202. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 150, at 692; see Ozee v. Am. Council of Gift
Annuities, 143 F.3d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1998) (an argument which cannot be made with a
“straight face” is frivolous, and is “sanctionable”).  Judges and attorneys are very familiar with
the “frivolous” standard because judges generally can sanction litigators for frivolous appeals,
motions, and other actions.  See supra note 139.
203. See supra note 63.
204. See infra Part IV.A(iv).
205. See I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (2008); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, §3.01, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 (tax rates
for 2009).
206. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 541, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096 (reducing the maximum tax rate from
fifty percent to twenty-eight percent, beginning in 1988).
207. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, at 7 (Comm. Print 1987), available at http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf
(“[D]eductions that benefit[] a limited number of taxpayers . . . are restricted by the [1986] Act
. . . . [a]s part of the approach . . . to reduce tax rates through base-broadening . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
208. If existing tax penalties are not adequate to deter fraudulent or criminal behavior, the
new penalty could apply in those situations.  The current failure-to-file penalty applies with
added gusto when the failure-to-file is fraudulent.  In that case, the statute triples the failure-to-
file penalty.  See I.R.C. § 6651(f).
209. Other civil penalties accrue over time.  The failure-to-file penalty accrues at the rate
The major exception is if the taxpayer filed a Disclosure Statement, IRS
Form 8275, with her tax return regarding a nonfrivolous position.  For these
purposes, “frivolous” would have its traditional legal meaning—a position
would be frivolous if it “[lacks] a legal basis or legal merit.”   Thus, the new202
penalty could be described as the false-filing-without-disclosure penalty.  203
The other two exceptions would apply when the taxpayer reports the correct
amount of tax due on her original tax return but (i) is unable to pay because of
a financial emergency, or (ii) is unable to pay and signs an installment
payment plan with the IRS.  204
Strict liability will be consistent with the current low, flat income tax
rates.   Congress drastically reduced tax rates for the wealthy in the Tax205
Reform Act of 1986,  and as part of the bargain, Congress anticipated that the206
wealthy would pay tax on their remaining taxable income.   Because the207
wealthy benefit greatly from today’s comparatively low tax rates, it is only fair
that a significant penalty apply when a wealthy taxpayer fails to pay his or her
fair share.
A. Basic Features of the Strict Liability Style System
The new penalty system would have the following four basic features.208
(1) Maximum Twenty-Five Percent Penalty Rate.  The penalty rate would
be one percent on the underpayment per month, generally reaching a
maximum of twenty-five percent in the twenty-fifth month.   Wealthy209
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of five percent per month for five months.  Id. § 6651(a)(1).  The failure-to-pay penalty accrues
at the rate of 0.5% per month for fifty months.  Id. § 6651(a)(2).
210. The proposed penalty would not provide an exception for a taxpayer who extends the
due date for filing the tax return.  Under current law, an individual can elect to extend the due
date for filing IRS Form 1040 from April 15 to August 15 by submitting IRS Form 4868 on or
before April 15.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-4(b) (1996).  Such a taxpayer can avoid the failure-to-pay
penalty by paying at least ninety percent of the tax ultimately due with the extension form on
April 15.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(3)(i) (1996).  In contrast to current law, the proposed
penalty would not excuse a ten percent underpayment.
211. I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (Supp. V 2005) (current tax rates).  For example, if a taxpayer at the
highest marginal tax rate failed to report $100 of taxable income, that would result in a $35 tax
underpayment.  If that failure is subject to a twenty-five percent penalty, the penalty would be
$8.75 [$35 x 25% = $8.75].  The combined income tax and penalty would be $43.75 [$35 +
$8.75].
212. As recently as 1986, the maximum effective tax rate for a wealthy taxpayer (not subject
to any penalties) was fifty percent.  From 1965 through 1980 the maximum rate was seventy
percent.  At the end of World War II the maximum rate was ninety-four percent.  See JEFFREY
L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 7 (3d ed. 2005) (listing the highest marginal tax
rates).
213. See supra notes 130, 202; see infra note 228.
taxpayers who file aggressively and are caught would almost always be subject
to the maximum twenty-five percent penalty because significant IRS audits
rarely conclude within two years of the original date for filing a tax return.210
As discussed in Part IV.B.2, as relief for the working class and the poor and
any taxpayer making a relatively small mistake, the maximum penalty rate
would be lower for tax underpayments less than $10,000.
Because of the modest maximum marginal income tax rate of thirty-five
percent on taxable income generally, income subject to the proposed twenty-
five percent penalty would still only be subject to an effective combined rate
of approximately forty-five percent.   In recent history, marginal tax rates211
exceeded that figure even when no penalties applied.212
(2) No Exception Based on the Odds of Success.  The new penalty system
would not force judges to act as bookies, estimating ex post the ex ante odds
that a legal position would succeed.  Instead, the judge would determine
whether the position was correct, and if not, the new penalty would
automatically apply unless one of the three exceptions applies.  Under the key
exception, if the taxpayer disclosed the tax position on IRS Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, the judge would only impose a penalty if the position
was frivolous under general legal standards.  The frivolous test is not based on
a mathematical probability, but instead whether a litigant can argue the
position with a “straight face.”  Judges have extensive experience applying this
general frivolous standard.  213
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214. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Politics and a New Substantial Understatement Penalty, 113
TAX NOTES 91-96 (2006).
215. See supra Part II.A.2.
216. Current law cuts the failure-to-pay penalty in half once the taxpayer enters into an
installment payment plan with the IRS.  See I.R.C. § 6651(h) (2008).
217. The current failure-to-pay penalty “does not represent interest paid on an indebtedness
which is deductible under [§] 163(a) [as interest], but rather represents an amount paid for
allowing the indebtedness to accrue.  The [failure to pay] penalty . . . does not serve the same
function as that served by the imposition of interest . . . .”  May v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 1114, 1116
(1976).  The negligence penalty and the substantial understatement penalty are additions to tax,
see I.R.C. § 6662(a), and therefore are not tax deductible.
218. For certain purposes, the IRS will disregard an attempted disclosure of information
unless the taxpayer accurately completes the Form 8275.  “For example, [the] disclosure will
not be considered adequate if [the taxpayer] attach[es] a copy of an acquisition agreement . . .
to disclose the issues involved in determining the basis of certain acquired assets.”  Instructions
for IRS Form 8275, at 3 (revised Feb. 2009 for use with the Aug. 2008 revision of Form 8275),
(3) No Exception for Reliance on a Tax Advisor or for “Good Faith” Filing.
“The taxpayer should not be able to elude [her tax] obligations through her tax
practitioner.  Or, stated differently, the taxpayer should not be able to
accomplish through an agent what she cannot accomplish directly.”   The214
exception for “good faith” filing can allow judges to excuse taxpayer mistakes
whenever any uncertainty exists.   As a result, neither the exception for215
reliance on a tax advisor, nor the good faith exception, would be available
under the new system.
(4) Two Minor Exceptions.  An exception would be available for a taxpayer
who fully reported the tax liability on a timely filed tax return but is unable to
pay because of a financial emergency, including but not limited to uninsured
damage caused by a flood, tornado, hurricane, theft, or other unforeseeable
events.  Also, the new penalty would not apply to a taxpayer who originally
reported the full tax liability, was unable to pay, voluntarily entered into an
installment payment plan with the IRS, and made the scheduled payments.216
Like other tax penalties, a taxpayer would not be allowed to deduct the new
penalty as interest or as a business expense.217
B. Ameliorating the Harshness of a Pure Strict Liability Approach
1. Protection for Conspicuous Disclosure of Nonfrivolous Positions
A strict liability approach is needed, in part, because of the low risk of audit.
This risk changes drastically if the taxpayer alerts the IRS about a potential tax
underpayment, and provides the IRS with an audit roadmap.  Congress and the
IRS have already created a procedure for taxpayers to notify the IRS about a
risky tax position.  A taxpayer can file IRS Form 8275, Disclosure Statement,
with a tax return.   On the Form 8275, the taxpayer identifies and describes218
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available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8275r.pdf.  
219. Part I of IRS Form 8275 requires the taxpayer to describe the item, state the schedule
and line number on which the item appears, and the dollar amount involved.  IRS, Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, at 1 (revised Aug. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8275.pdf.  Part II requires a “detailed explanation” which “must include information that
reasonably can be expected to apprise the IRS of the identity of the item, its amount, and the
nature of the controversy or potential controversy.”  Instructions for IRS Form 8275, supra note
218, at 3.  
220. The new system would require that the taxpayer place the Form 8275 on top when
assembling the Form 1040 and the related schedules and attachments.  See IRS, 1040
INSTRUCTIONS 2007, at 62, available at http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2007/i1040.pdf
(setting forth the rules for assembling the tax return).
221. A taxpayer who fails to file a Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, can be subject to the
substantial understatement penalty if her position has less than a forty percent chance of
success.  If a taxpayer files a Form 8275, the forty percent standard drops to a twenty percent
standard.  I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
222. See id. (the “disclosure” exception applies only to the substantial understatement
penalty).
223. “[M]ost taxpayers are likely to choose not to disclose and face a low risk of paying
120% or so of a given tax liability plus interest rather than to disclose and take a much higher
risk of paying 100% of the same liability.”  Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note
19, at 582; see also id. at 583 (“[T]he existing inducement to disclose is unlikely to work in
many cases, and it is least likely to work [when] it would be needed most.”).
224. See supra notes 139 and 202 (defining “frivolous” under this proposal).
225. The proposed system might encourage a few taxpayers to file Form 8275, Disclosure
Statement, and to claim tax positions which have less than a twenty percent chance of success,
but are not frivolous.  However, most taxpayers likely will be reluctant to trigger an audit by
filing a Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, because during an audit, the IRS may find other
positions to challenge, either on the same tax return, or on a tax return for a prior or later tax
year, if the statute of limitations is still open.  See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (generally the statute of
limitations on tax matters is three years).  
226. Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 582 (“The variation of nominal
penalties for disclosed and undisclosed transactions is relatively modest.  On the other hand, the
probably of detection increases dramatically with disclosure.”).
the uncertain position in detail.   The risk of audit should approach one219
hundred percent when the taxpayer files a Form 8275.   220
Unfortunately, current law only rewards a taxpayer filing IRS Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, with a slight edge in avoiding the substantial
understatement penalty,  and the negligence penalty applies the same whether221
or not the taxpayer files a Form 8275.   Thus, the reward for conspicuously222
disclosing a position is not great.223
Under the new proposal, as long as a position disclosed on Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, is not frivolous,  the taxpayer would not be subject to224
a penalty.   This protection is appropriate because the risk of audit would225
approach one hundred percent.   Under the proposal, the taxpayer seeking226
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227. See supra note 220.
228. See supra notes 139, 202 (describing the “frivolous” standard under this proposal).
Parties generally can raise nonfrivolous arguments without fear of sanction.  See I.R.C. § 6673
(stating that if the taxpayer’s litigation position is frivolous, penalties and court costs can be
imposed); see also T.C. R. 33, available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/notice.htm (U.S. Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002), cited
in Lavoie, supra note 26, at 8 n.34.  Also, parties generally can maintain contradictory positions.
See, e.g., William L. Davis, Tools of Submission: The Weakening Broad-Form ‘Mandate’ in
Texas and the Roles of Jury and Judge, 24 REV. LITIG. 57, 101 (2005) (“[T]he Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure permit parties to make alternative arguments–even when doing so is self-
contradictory . . . .”).
229. Lavoie, supra note 26, at 7 (“[T]axpayers should have the legal right to challenge their
obligation to pay such impositions even if they only have a small chance of success.”); see
supra note 228.  
230. When the IRS sends a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer, the taxpayer generally has
ninety days to “file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency,” and
except as otherwise provided, the IRS cannot assess the deficiency, or seek to collect, until the
end of the ninety-day period.  I.R.C. § 6213(a).  If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax
Court within the ninety-day period, then the IRS cannot assess and collect “until the decision
of the Tax Court has become final.”  Id.
231. I.R.C. § 6662(a).
penalty protection must attach the Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, on the
top of IRS Form 1040, to reduce the odds that the IRS would overlook it.227
For taxpayers who file electronically, the IRS should adopt procedures to
ensure that Form 8275 is not overlooked.
Immunity would not be available when disclosing a frivolous position.
Otherwise, taxpayers might file Form 8275 for bogus tax positions and hope
to win the audit lottery.  Including a frivolous standard in the new penalty
system will not create significant problems like other probability standards
because “frivolous” will have its customary legal meaning, and judges are
accustomed to applying that standard.   In the same way that judges routinely228
penalize frivolous litigants, judges likely will not hesitate to penalize taxpayers
behaving frivolously.
Including the disclosure exception for nonfrivolous positions has one other
significant advantage.  Generally a party in litigation may maintain a
nonfrivolous position without fear of sanctions.   Under this proposal, a229
taxpayer who files a Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, can litigate a
nonfrivolous tax position before paying the tax, without fear of a penalty.230
2. Graduated Penalty Rate for Small Mistakes
Despite the other relief provisions, a strict liability approach still may
appear harsh, particularly for small tax underpayments.  Although the rate of
the negligence penalty is now a flat twenty percent,  it was only five percent231
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232. See Stark, supra note 82, at 135.
233. For example, in 2009, the tax rate for a married couple filing jointly is thirty-five
percent on their taxable income over $372,950.  Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, §
3.01 (Table 1).  A couple taxed at the thirty-five percent marginal tax rate would need to make
a mistake in excess of $14,000 to cause a tax underpayment in excess of $5000 ($14,000 error
x 35% tax rate = $4900 tax underpayment).  Taxpayers taxed at a lower rate could make bigger
mistakes and still be subject to only the five percent penalty rate.  
234. The size of the error subject to the five percent and ten percent rates combined is simply
twice the size of the error subject to the five percent rate.  See supra note 233.
235. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (implying that only a “wrongdoer” should
be penalized).
236. See supra Part I.B.  
before 1982.   Graduated rates will make the proposed penalty much milder232
for many taxpayers.  Accordingly, the proposed maximum penalty rate is only
five percent on the first $5000 of a tax underpayment, and only ten percent on
the next $5000 of a tax underpayment.  Even taxpayers at the highest marginal
tax rate (in 2009) could make mistakes in reporting taxable income up to
$14,000 and still be subject to only a five percent penalty,  or mistakes up to233
$28,000 in taxable income and still be subject to only a ten percent maximum
penalty.   For the poor and most working-class individuals, the chance of234
making a mistake in excess of $28,000 is slim or nonexistent.  Thus, a large
percentage of taxpayers likely would only be facing a maximum penalty of ten
percent at most. 
V. Anticipating Challenges and Modifications
A. Challenges Based on the Complexity of Tax Law
Commentators may argue that this proposal fails to appreciate the
complexity of the federal income tax system, and the bona fide uncertainly that
honest taxpayers face.
1. Argument to Penalize Only Taxpayers Who Intentionally Underpay
It may be argued that a “penalty” should only be imposed after a judge
determines that the actor has done something wrong.   When the government235
has made the laws so complex that even experts disagree about the proper tax
treatment of bona fide economic transactions,  should we penalize ordinary236
citizens who make mistakes?
A pure strict liability sanction likely would penalize many actors who did
not intentionally underpay.  However, the proposal in this Article is more
nuanced.  The option to disclose nonfrivolous positions and be immune from
penalties, the low risk of audit, the graduated penalty rate, and other factors,
will restrict the unfair results to a few, truly unusual cases.  Three examples
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237. Professor Raskolnikov describes the gambler’s choice under current law.  “Without
disclosure the taxpayer is playing the audit lottery and facing exceedingly favorable odds.”
Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment, supra note 19, at 582.  “[M]ost taxpayers are likely to
choose not to disclose and face a low risk of paying 120% or so of a given tax liability plus
interest rather than to disclose and take a much higher risk of paying 100% of the same
liability.”  Id.
238. See supra note 15.
239. See supra Part IV.B.1.
240. Jerome Kurtz, Penalty Revision and the Case for Section 6661, 43 TAX NOTES 1617,
1618 (1989), quoted in Ventry, Vices and Virtues, supra note 58, at 1090. 
241. When the taxpayer believes her chance of success is less than fifty percent, she is taking
a greater risk and relying on the audit lottery even more.  
242. The IRS estimates that the average taxpayer will need to spend approximately six hours
to file Form 8275.  Instructions for IRS Form 8275, supra note 218, at 3 (three hours and thirty-
five minutes for recordkeeping; fifty-three minutes for learning about the law or the form; and
fifty-nine minutes for preparing and sending the form to the IRS). 
highlight how the proposal would apply when the taxpayer underpays taxes,
and the taxpayer arguably did not intentionally underpay.
First, Greta Gambler believes there is a fifty percent chance that she is
entitled to deduct a payment.  Greta claims the deduction, and chooses not to
file the IRS Form 8275, Disclosure Statement.  The IRS audits, and Greta loses
on the merits.  Greta Gambler is liable for the proposed penalty even though
some may argue that she acted appropriately.  However, on closer inspection
this result is appropriate.  
Greta Gambler took a calculated risk with the odds in her favor,  but237
happened to lose the gamble.  The odds were in Greta’s favor because even if
her annual income exceeds $200,000, the risk of audit was only about three
percent.   If she had filed Form 8275, she would have been immune from the238
penalty.   While disclosure would forfeit the “advantage of having the239
questionable item overlooked [by the IRS],” this is “an advantage to which
[she] is not entitled [because] [t]ax liabilities should be determined by the tax
law, not the vagaries of audit.”   240
This analysis applies whenever the taxpayer believes her chance of success
is fifty percent or less.   In these situations, a taxpayer should either file Form241
8275, Disclosure Statement, or be prepared to pay a penalty if she loses the
audit lottery.  Although the disclosure approach requires the taxpayer to file
an extra form,  it results in the taxpayer paying the correct amount of tax and242
avoids distributive justice problems.
Second, Edith Error transposes numbers, or makes a math error, on her tax
return.  In this situation, the taxpayer would not file a Form 8275, Disclosure
Statement, because she has no idea she is claiming a questionable position, or
making a mistake.  Because she underpaid her taxes and did not disclose, Edith
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243. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(2) (1992) (Example 4). 
244. See SALTZMAN, supra note 24 (regarding the IRS computer-matching program).
245. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed this view in dicta.  Boyle v. United States, 469
U.S. 241, 251 (1985); see supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
246. See supra Part II.A.3.
Error would be liable for the penalty under this proposal.  It may be argued
that this is unfair because Edith did not intentionally underpay, and she did not
believe she was filing aggressively.  
As a preliminary matter, current law may penalize Edith Error in this
situation.  The regulation provides that a taxpayer who “procrastinated . . . and
hurriedly gathered together [her] tax records [and] . . . prepared a return”
would not be eligible for the reasonable cause exception.   In addition, the243
penalty under this proposal likely will be minimal because the IRS computer-
matching program will catch these errors quickly,  and the proposed penalty244
only accrues at the rate of one percent per month. 
Third, Opal Optimistic is considering whether to claim a deduction.  She
knows the tax result is not absolutely clear, but believes she has a greater than
fifty percent chance of success.  Opal claims the deduction and does not file
the IRS Form 8275, Disclosure Statement.  The IRS audits, and her position
eventually fails on the merits because Opal and her tax advisor made a legal
or factual error.  The proposal would penalize Opal.  Commentators may argue
this is inappropriate because the taxpayer acted reasonably.  In this scenario,
it seems unlikely that the taxpayer should file a Form 8275, Disclosure
Statement, because she believes her position is a winner.  
While this result may seem harsh, a few circumstances cushion the impact.
As a preliminary matter, the low risk of audit makes it unlikely that the IRS
will catch the mistake.  If the transaction in question occurs each year for
several years, the IRS likely will not catch it every year.  Also, if the amount
of the tax underpayment is under $10,000, the penalty rate will only be five or
ten percent.  In addition, Opal and her tax advisor did make a mistake, which
they might have avoided by exercising greater diligence. 
As discussed in Part II.C, a fault-based penalty system creates problems that
threaten the integrity of the entire federal income tax system.  This Article
asserts that although this proposal will penalize Opal Optimistic and similarly
situated taxpayers in isolated situations, the benefits of the new proposal will
far outweigh the problems.
2. Argument for Immunity for Reliance on a Tax Advisor
When faced with uncertainty, one can argue that a reasonably prudent
person would seek the advice of an expert, and then follow that advice.   The245
current system grants immunity to taxpayers using that approach.246
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247. “The solution [for convincing taxpayers to invest in tax shelters] has been for the tax
shelter promoter to obtain and furnish to the taxpayer (at the taxpayer’s expense) an opinion of
independent tax counsel . . . .  [T]he effect of such an opinion—or so it is hoped—is to
immunize the taxpayer from the danger of civil penalties.”  Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note
73, at 1940-41; see also Matthew Piper, Note, Gimme Shelter: How the Accountant’s
Contingency Fee and the Attorney’s Opinion Letter Have Contributed to the Proliferation of
Abusive Tax Shelters, 83 N.D. L. REV. 261 (2007).
248. The applicable legislative history states,
XXThe Committee believes that it is critical that the Secretary [of the Treasury]
have the authority to censure tax advisors as well as to impose monetary sanctions
against tax advisors because of the important role of tax advisors in our tax
system.  Use of these sanctions is expected to curb the participation of tax advisors
in . . . tax shelter activity . . . .
S. REP. NO. 108-257, at 106 (2004).
249. In 2004, Congress granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to “impose standards
applicable to the rendering of written advice with respect to any entity, transaction plan or
arrangement . . . which is of a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax
avoidance or evasion.”  American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, § 822(b), Pub. L. No. 108-357,
118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §330(d) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added).  
250. Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., Section 10.35(b)(4)(ii) of Circular 230 Is Invalid (But Just in Case
It Is Valid, Please Note That You Cannot Rely on This Article to Avoid the Imposition of
Penalties), 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 293, 294-95 (2007) (discussing the legend that generally
must appear on e-mails sent by tax lawyers as a result of the Circular 230 regulations).
251. “Ever since Treasury issued amendments to Circular 230 covering formal opinions as
well as other forms of written advice, there has been a torrent of objections from tax advisers.”
Deborah H. Schenk, The Circular 230 Amendments: Time to Throw Them Out and Start Over,
110 TAX NOTES 1311, 1311 (2006).
252. See Vasquez, supra note 250, at 329-30 (“Circular 230[] . . . is a troubling misstep . .
. .  The regulation eviscerates the plain meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, well established
case law and agency regulation, sidesteps the Administrative Procedure Act, treats similarly
situated taxpayers inequitably, is overbroad, and is contrary to First Amendment and Federalism
concerns.”); Schenk, supra note 251, at 1315 (“[Circular 230] raises substantial First
Amendment questions.”).  
Although this argument has theoretical appeal, in practice, it grants
immunity for wealthy taxpayers claiming big deductions.  A wealthy taxpayer
can purchase an opinion letter from a tax advisor, which can serve as penalty
insurance.   Indeed, in response to the fear that tax advisors were selling247
opinion letters without proper due diligence,  in 2004 the government began248
a process to regulate the manner in which taxpayer representatives issue
opinion letters that provide penalty protection.   The new rules have led to249
substantial administrative costs  and bitter debates in the tax world.250 251
However, the rules may have no practical impact on substantial transactions
for wealthy taxpayers.  252
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253. This proposal only eliminates the demand for opinion letters to avoid the negligence
and substantial understatement penalties.  There will be many other penalties, and other
situations, for which taxpayers will seek opinion letters from tax advisors.  See Schizer, supra
note 98, at 360 (arguing that taxpayers will still seek opinion letters for honest advice against
taking overly aggressive positions).
254. Id. (“The cleanest way to avoid this race to the bottom [with tax advisors competing
to sell opinion letters as penalty insurance] . . . is to strip away the penalty protection function
from tax opinions.”).  
255. See supra Part II.A.1 regarding the applicable standards.
256. See supra Part II.A.3 (the exception for reliance on a tax advisor); supra Part II.A.2 (the
exception for “good faith” filing).
The enactment of the proposed penalty, and the repeal of the current
penalties, would end this debate over opinion letters  because it would253
eliminate the demand for opinion letters sold as penalty insurance.   The254
proposed penalty would apply whether or not the taxpayer relied on a tax
advisor.  
3. Over-Deterrence Argument
Another potential challenge is that under the proposal, a taxpayer who has
a meritorious position, but not a bullet-proof position, will refrain from taking
the position out of fear.  The taxpayer may fear that the analysis is overly
optimistic, or that the ultimate decision-maker will make a mistake.  In that
scenario, the taxpayer may overpay taxes to avoid the risk of the proposed
penalty.
In response, it seems unlikely that many people will be deterred from
claiming appropriate positions that can reduce their taxes, particularly because
of the low audit rates.  Furthermore, the taxpayer can eliminate the penalty risk
by filing a Disclosure Statement, IRS Form 8275, with the tax return. 
4. Problems When the Ultimate Decision-Maker Is Wrong
When the ultimate decision-maker in a tax case is wrong and decides
against the taxpayer, the new proposed penalty will exacerbate the problem.
Under current law, the ultimate decision-maker might be wrong on the merits,
but can decide that the taxpayer’s position met the applicable standard to avoid
penalties  or qualified for another exception.   The proposal in this Article255 256
will eliminate this beneficial flexibility, and the taxpayer may be doubly
wronged. 
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257. If the taxpayer disagrees with the IRS auditor’s conclusions, the taxpayer can appeal
to the IRS Appeals Office.  See Donald C. Alexander & Brian S. Gleicher, IRS Procedures:
Examinations and Appeals, 623-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-80.  If not satisfied with the
settlement offer from the IRS Appeals Officer, the taxpayer can petition the Tax Court within
ninety days of receiving the IRS notice of deficiency.  I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2008); Robert A.
Levine & Theodore D. Peyser, Tax Court Litigation, 630-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-1; id. at A-7
(As an alternative to petitioning the Tax Court, the taxpayer “can pay the tax, file a claim for
refund, and then file suit for a refund in either a federal district court or the Court of Federal
Claims.”).  A taxpayer can appeal the decision of the trial court to a Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the taxpayer can appeal that court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
258. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM.
SOC. REV. 894, 896 (1936), available at http://www.compilerpress.atfreeweb.com/Anno%20
Merton%20Unintended.htm.
259. “The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that actions of
people—and especially of government—always have effects that are unanticipated or
unintended.”  Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS (David Henderson ed., 2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/LIBRARY/Enc/
Unintended Consequences.html. 
260. A government action also can have beneficial, or neutral, unintended consequences.
See Norton, supra note 259.
261. There would only be a tax underpayment if the errors in favor of the taxpayer had a
In response, the tax system allows multiple levels of appeals,  which257
hopefully reduce the risk of a wrong decision if the taxpayer can afford to keep
appealing.  Also, because of the low audit rates, it is more likely that a
taxpayer will never be challenged than that the IRS will audit and the taxpayer
will be a victim of a bad decision.  
B. Problems Based on the Law of Unintended Consequences 
In his breakthrough article, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive
Social Action,  American sociologist Robert K. Merton observed that258
governmental action almost always triggers unanticipated consequences.259
The proposed penalty system likely will not escape this law.  The costs of
negative unintended consequences,  however, will be small compared to the260
benefits. 
1. Negative Impacts on the Working Class and the Poor
Sometimes the working class and the poor make mistakes on tax returns.
In addition to the low risk of audit, two other factors will minimize the impact
of the proposed penalty system.
First, when a taxpayer is trying to file accurately, the taxpayer may make
one or more mistakes that cause a tax underpayment, but may make one or
more mistakes that cause a tax overpayment.  The proposed penalty would
only apply to a net underpayment.  261
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greater impact on the tax owed than errors in favor of the government.
262. See supra note 30.
263. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
264. Problems could arise if the employer does not withhold enough, perhaps because of
mathematical errors, clerical errors, or errors in the number of dependants claimed on IRS Form
W-4. 
265. See supra Part IV.A(iv).
266. This is the maximum amount for joint filers with two or more qualifying children in
2009.  Rev. Proc. 2008-66, § 3.06, 2007-45 I.R.B. 1107.  The maximum for joint filers with one
qualifying child is $38,583, and for joint filers with no qualifying children, the maximum is
$16,560.  Id.
267. See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 415 n.41 (2005)
(“Many will perform complex calculations . . . only to find that they do not qualify . . . or that
they qualify for a credit that does not entirely offset their costs.  For those taxpayers, the [credit]
is burdensome complexity, not beneficial complexity.”).
268. “The Earned Income Credit . . . was the source of many errors by taxpayers and tax
practitioners in preparing returns.”  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
CONTINUING PROBLEMS AFFECT OTHERWISE SUCCESSFUL 1994 FILING SEASON 2 (1994),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95005.pdf, quoted in Dorothy A. Brown, Race
and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790, 793 n.14 (2007).
Second, the working class and the poor may make mistakes that are quickly
caught by the IRS computer-matching program,  particularly because most,262
if not all, of their income will be subject to withholding or information
reporting.   As a result, the penalty may be only one or two percent if the263
computers catch the mistake quickly.
A more serious potential problem for the working class and the poor is the
risk of receiving income, and then suffering a cash shortage at the time the tax
payment is due.  This risk should be nonexistent for wages subject to
withholding because the employer withholds the taxes before paying the
employee.   However, other types of income such as compensation received264
as an independent contractor, interest, dividends, and proceeds from the sale
of property are not subject to withholding, and it is the taxpayer’s
responsibility to retain sufficient funds to make quarterly estimated tax
payments, or to pay the tax due by April 15th.  Although the proposed penalty
could drive a working class or poor individual who is short on cash even
further in debt, the proposal includes exceptions for financial emergencies and
for taxpayers who enter into an installment payment plan with the IRS.265
Another special concern for the working poor is the earned income credit.
This refundable credit is only available to taxpayers with earned income below
$43,415 in 2009,  and unfortunately it is complex.   Many taxpayers266 267
calculate the credit wrong every year.268
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269. See supra Part IV.B.2.
270. Lavoie, supra note 26, at 3-4 (“Taxpayer compliance is linked to perceptions regarding
the overall fairness of the tax system.  When taxpayers perceive the [IRS] as overreaching, they
lose faith in the system and voluntary compliance is harmed.” (footnote omitted)); see also
Andreoni, supra note 19, at 851; Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 615-16.
271. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (1992). 
272. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 233-34 (even for taxpayers in the highest marginal income tax bracket,
the penalty rate would only be five percent for mistakes up to $14,000, and the penalty rate
would only be ten percent for mistakes from $14,000 to $28,000).
The proposed graduated penalty rate would mitigate the impact of the
proposal on these taxpayers.   Moreover, a taxpayer claiming the earned269
income credit frequently owes no additional tax with her return, usually
because of withholding on wages.  The taxpayer files a tax return merely to
claim the earned income credit, and in those cases the government could treat
the tax return as a refund claim.  As a result, the new penalty would not apply
because there is no tax underpayment.
2. Exacerbating Antipathy Toward Government
Norms that may decrease compliance include perceptions that the tax rules
are unfair  or that the IRS is a bully.  This proposal will increase the270
maximum penalty rate for inaccurate filing from twenty percent to twenty-five
percent, and will eliminate exceptions that may be viewed as taxpayer friendly,
such as the exception for reliance on a tax advisor, the exception for tax
positions with at least a twenty percent chance of success, and the exception
for an “honest misunderstanding of fact or law.”   As a result, policymakers,271
practitioners, and scholars who emphasize norms may argue that this proposal
will make tax enforcement more inflexible and will cause more taxpayers to
file aggressively.   272
At least four factors may prevent negative taxpayer perceptions.  First, the
proposal adds a twenty-five percent penalty, but removes the twenty percent
negligence and substantial understatement penalties and the current failure-to-
pay penalty, which can reach twenty-five percent.  Second, under this
proposal, most taxpayers would only face a five percent penalty or a ten
percent penalty, not a twenty-five percent penalty.   Third, the proposed273
penalty will reduce the discretion in administering tax penalties, increasing the
chance that the tax system will treat similarly situated taxpayers the same.  In
particular, wealthy taxpayers using tax dodges will no longer find shelter from
tax penalties by purchasing opinion letters from tax advisors.  Taxpayers may
respond favorably to a more just system.  Fourth, taxpayers may perceive that
the new penalty system will decrease tax cheating.  If people believe that their
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274. See Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?, supra note 19, at 367-69. 
275. Generally in a tax case, either the amount received is taxable or it is not; either the
payment is deductible or it is not; either the penalty applies or it does not.  There are exceptions.
For example, in valuation cases, a court can choose a figure between the value proposed by the
IRS and the value proposed by the taxpayer.  See, e.g., Turner v. Comm’r, 13 T.C.M. (CCH)
462 (1954); see also Cohan v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 743 (1928), aff’d and rev’d 39 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1930). 
276. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 8.1.3.4 (Appeals Officer), available
at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/ch01s02.html#d0e1092; Lavoie, supra note 26, at 10.
277. Generally, the IRS will not settle for less than twenty percent on an issue because the
public might view that as a “nuisance” payment to prevent the IRS from harassing the taxpayer.
Lavoie, supra note 26, at 10 n.50.
278. See supra Parts IV.A(ii), IV.B.1 (discussing the three exceptions to the proposed new
penalty system). 
neighbors are complying with the tax laws, reciprocal motivations to comply
will strengthen.274
3. Practical Impact When the IRS Attempts to Settle a Case
When a court considers a single issue, normally the court must use an all-or-
nothing approach.   In contrast, an IRS Appeals Officer has great flexibility275
in settling a tax dispute.  An IRS Appeals Officer can consider the hazards of
litigation,  and settle cases on a percentage, with the taxpayer winning276
anywhere from nothing to eighty percent on an issue.   Also, an IRS Appeals277
Officer can waive an asserted penalty even if the settlement calls for the IRS
to collect all of the asserted tax underpayment.  Part of this flexibility would
disappear under the proposed penalty system.  The IRS would have to collect
the proposed penalty on any tax underpayment, except in cases of disclosure,
a financial emergency, or when the taxpayer and IRS entered into an
installment payment agreement.278
Nevertheless, as long as the IRS Appeals Officer and the taxpayer are aware
of the strict liability nature of the new penalty system, they could factor that
into their settlement negotiations.  Thus, rather than agreeing to a fifty percent
settlement with no penalty, the parties might agree on a forty percent
settlement that would automatically trigger the proposed penalty. 
4. Practical Impact When a Court Decides a Tax Case
Currently a judge has tremendous flexibility in deciding whether to enforce
the negligence or substantial understatement penalties.  Under this proposal,
that flexibility would disappear.  In effect, the stakes in tax dispute cases
would automatically rise.  With a new twenty-five percent strict liability style
penalty and a thirty-five percent maximum marginal tax rate, a judge deciding
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279. In 2009, the thirty-five percent rate applies to taxable income over $372,950, except
in the case of married individuals filing separately, in which case the thirty-five percent rate
applies to taxable income over $178,850.  Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 § 3.01
(Table 4).
280. IRC § 1(i)(2) (2008).  For example, if a taxpayer fails to report $100 of taxable income,
the tax deficiency will be $35 ($100 x 35% = $35).  The penalty on that tax deficiency would
be $8.75 ($35 x 25% = $8.75).  Thus, the combined tax and penalty would be $43.75.  See supra
note 211.
281. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
282. Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. 1, 56 § 15 (discussing the fees); id. at 68 (Appendix
A, § (A)(3)(c)) ($11,500 for “all other requests” after February 1, 2008).
283. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (stating that the penalty rate for the failure-to-file penalty is five
percent per month for five months, for a maximum penalty of twenty-five percent); see id. §
6651(a)(2) (stating that the penalty rate for the failure-to-pay penalty is 0.5% per month for fifty
months, for a maximum of twenty-five percent). 
against a wealthy taxpayer  will force the taxpayer to pay approximately279
forty-five percent of the amount in controversy to the IRS.   As a result, some280
may argue that judges may decide more close cases for the taxpayer.
However, from 1965 to 1980, the maximum marginal tax rate alone, without
penalties, exceeded sixty percent,  and judges decided cases against281
taxpayers during that period.
5. Greater Demand for IRS Guidance
This proposal may increase demand for IRS guidance on uncertain issues.
Subject to various exceptions, a taxpayer currently can request a letter ruling
from the IRS on an uncertain issue for a fee of $11,500 per ruling request.282
Taxpayers who can choose whether to enter into a transaction, and can wait for
an IRS response, may find this letter ruling process desirable.  Other taxpayers
may simply file a Disclosure Statement, IRS Form 8275, with the tax return
to avoid a penalty for claiming an uncertain tax position. 
C. Features of the Proposal That May Need Adjustment
1. The Twenty-Five Percent Rate
A twenty-five percent rate is used for other civil tax penalties, including the
current failure-to-file penalty and the current failure-to-pay penalty.283
Nevertheless, there is no magic in the twenty-five percent figure.  This
proposal’s objective, to promote accurate tax filing, might be better served
with a slightly higher or lower penalty rate.  The rate, however, likely should
not be set significantly higher or lower for the following three reasons.
First, a significantly higher rate could trigger ability-to-pay problems.  With
a thirty-five percent maximum income tax rate and a twenty-five percent
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284. IRC § 1(i)(2); see supra note 280 (regarding the forty-five percent combined figure).
285. Generally, an amount received will only be subject to income tax if there is an
“accession to wealth.”  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  
286. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
287. The IRS generally has three years to audit a tax return.  I.R.C. § 6501(a).
288. See supra note 28 (regarding the IRS computer-matching program).
penalty rate, the combined rate would be approximately forty-five percent.284
Thus, if the taxpayer receives a $1 “accession to wealth,”  fails to pay the tax285
on time, is audited, is taxed at the maximum rate and is liable for the new
twenty-five percent penalty, the total amount due will be approximately forty-
five cents (plus interest).  In that scenario, the taxpayer hopefully will still
have the money to pay the tax obligation and will have approximately fifty-
five cents remaining.  However, if Congress set the penalty rate significantly
higher, for example at fifty percent, the combined rate would then be
approximately fifty-five percent, and taxpayers would be less likely to have the
wealth to pay the obligations, particularly if the value of their investments
significantly declined between the time they received the amount and the time
they must pay the tax and penalty.
Second, a significantly higher rate could be viewed as excessive,
particularly when a taxpayer makes an honest mistake and fails to disclose.  A
penalty significantly higher than twenty-five percent could be perceived as
outrageous and could trigger anti-IRS or anti-government reactions, which in
turn might reduce taxpayer compliance.286
Third, the wealthy may view a penalty with a significantly lower rate as
trivial, and it would have no impact on taxpayer behavior.
2. The Accrual Rate of the Penalty
The timing of the accrual also could be reconsidered.  The proposed accrual
rate of one percent per month, reaching a maximum in the twenty-fifth month,
would give taxpayers an incentive to review their tax returns shortly after April
15th to correct errors.  Also, bookkeepers, accountants, and other third parties
who provide necessary information to taxpayers may spot corrections shortly
after April 15th.  Thus, honest taxpayers may benefit from the gradual build-up
of the penalty.  The twenty-five month build-up period likely will not assist
wealthy taxpayers who file aggressively and then are caught on audit because
a significant audit would rarely conclude within twenty-five months of the date
the taxpayer filed the return.  287
Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to more closely coordinate the accrual
period with the time needed for the IRS computer-matching program to catch
taxpayer errors.   Many of the errors caught by the IRS computer-matching288
program likely are unintentional.  Thus, for example, if the IRS generally
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289. The government would need to impose some minimal penalty for the first four months
to discourage taxpayers from delaying payment for four months.  Another approach might be
to apply a lower penalty rate on tax underpayments detected by the IRS through the computer-
matching program if the tax underpayment is under a certain dollar amount (e.g., $500).
290. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (the failure-to-file penalty).
291. Except in cases when the failure-to-file and failure-to-pay is intentional, there is no
need to impose a double penalty because the penalty will not change conscious behavior.
Instead, in those situations, a single twenty-five percent penalty should be sufficient.
292. The negligence penalty and the substantial understatement penalty are described as
accuracy-related penalties.  I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1)-(2).  
completes its computer-matching program within three months for timely-filed
tax returns, it might be preferable for the proposed penalty to build-up at an
even lower rate for the first three months.289
3. Coordination with Other Penalties
If the existing civil fraud penalties and criminal penalties are adequate to
deter fraudulent and criminal tax behavior, the new penalty would not need to
apply when the civil fraud or criminal penalties apply.  
Also, in regards to coordinating with other penalties, the wealthy who file
aggressively may tend to file tax returns on time to avoid the failure-to-file
penalty,  and only the uninformed and the procrastinators fail to file on time.290
As a result, if both penalties apply to a taxpayer, perhaps the proposed penalty
should be offset by the failure-to-file penalty.   291
Conclusion
Our current tax system has accuracy-related penalties  that seldom292
penalize inaccuracies, and a failure-to-pay penalty that seldom penalizes
failures to pay.
A taxpayer can dodge the accuracy-related penalties by (i) relying on the
advice of a tax advisor; or (ii) showing that she believed she was acting with
reasonable care and in good faith; or (iii) showing that the position had at least
a one-out-of-five chance of success in the case of the negligence penalty, or at
least a two-out-of-five chance for the substantial understatement penalty.  A
taxpayer can dodge the failure-to-pay penalty by filing inaccurately, waiting
to see if the IRS catches the error, and then promptly paying the amount due
after all chances of appeal expire.  As a result, the current system sends
confusing signals that encourage wealthy taxpayers to file aggressively, not
accurately.
Congress should repeal the existing accuracy-related penalties and the
failure-to-pay penalty.  In their place, Congress should enact a strict liability
style penalty that will send a clear message.  In Appendix A, this Article
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293. Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co. of N.J., 338 U.S. 561, 565 (1950).
provides a proposed statute to adopt a “false-filing-without-disclosure”
penalty.  The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that our tax system relies on
taxpayers paying the correct amount of tax on time.   This proposal will293
penalize taxpayers who shirk their duty.
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Statute to Create a New False-Filing-Without-Disclosure
Penalty.
New IRC §6651A.  False-Filing-Without-Disclosure Penalty.
(a) ADDITION TO THE TAX – In the case of a failure to pay any amount of
any tax required to be shown on a return listed in I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) on or
before the date prescribed for payment of such tax (determined without regard
to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is
described in subsection (c), there shall be added to the amount due one percent
of the amount of such tax underpayment if the failure is for not more than one
month, with an additional one percent for each additional month or fraction
thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding twenty-five percent
in the aggregate, provided that the penalty rate on the first $5000 of any tax
underpayment shall not exceed five percent, and the penalty rate on the next
$5000 of any tax underpayment shall not exceed ten percent.
(b) PENALTY IMPOSED ON NET AMOUNT DUE – For purposes of subsection
(a), the amount of the tax underpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any
part of the tax which is paid on or before the beginning of such month and the
amount of any credit against the tax which the taxpayer may claim on the
return.
(c) EXCEPTIONS – This section shall not apply to –
(1) Any failure to pay a tax based on a nonfrivolous position disclosed by
the taxpayer in such manner as designated by the Secretary in regulations.
(2) Any month during which an installment agreement under I.R.C. § 6159
is in effect for the payment of such tax, and the taxpayer pays all installments
when due under such agreement.
(3) Any failure to pay a tax liability reported on an original filed return to
the extent the failure to pay is caused by a financial emergency.
[RELATED STATUTORY CHANGES – The existing failure-to-pay
penalty provisions would be excised from I.R.C. § 6651; the substantial
understatement penalty and the negligence penalty would be excised from
I.R.C. § 6662; and I.R.C. § 6664 would be amended as appropriate.]
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